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Abstract. It is shown how the generating functional method of De Dominicis can be
used to solve the dynamics of the original version of the minority game (MG), in which
agents observe real as opposed to fake market histories. Here one again finds exact
closed equations for correlation and response functions, but now these are defined in
terms of two connected effective non-Markovian stochastic processes: a single effective
agent equation similar to that of the ‘fake’ history models, and a second effective
equation for the overall market bid itself (the latter is absent in ‘fake’ history models).
The result is an exact theory, from which one can calculate from first principles both
the persistent observables in the MG and the distribution of history frequencies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Ht
E-mail: tcoolen@mth.kcl.ac.uk
1. Introduction
Minority Games (MG) [1] are simple and transparent models which were designed
to increase our understanding of the complex collective processes which result from
inductive decision making by interacting agents in simplified ‘markets’. They are
mathematical implementations of the so-called El Farol bar problem [2]. Many versions
of the MG have by now been studied in the literature, see e.g. the recent textbook [3]
for an overview. They differ in the type of microscopic dynamics used (e.g. batch versus
on-line, stochastic versus deterministic), in the definition of the information provided
to the agents (real-valued versus discrete, true versus fake market histories) and the
agents’ decision making strategies, and also in the specific recipe used for converting
the observed external information into a trading action (inner products versus look-up
tables). Models with ‘fake’ market histories (proposed first in [4]), where at each point
in time all agents are given random rather than real market data upon which to base
their decisions, have the advantage of being Markovian and were therefore the first to be
studied and solved in the theoretical physics literature using techniques from equilibrium
[5, 6, 7, 8] and non-equilibrium [9, 10, 11, 12] statistical mechanics.
After [4] had revealed the similarity between the behaviour of the volatility in the
standard MG models with real versus fake market histories, it was shown via numerical
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simulations that this statement did not extend to many variations of the MG, such
as games with different strategy valuation update rules [13] or with populations where
agents do not all observe history strings of the same length [14]. Furthermore, even in the
standard MG one does find profound differences in the history frequency distributions
(although there these differences do not impact on observables such as the volatility
or the fraction of ‘frozen’ agents). A partly phenomenological attempt at analyzing
quantitatively the effects of true history in the MG was presented in [15], and followed
by a simulation study [16] of bid periodicities induced by having real histories. After
these two papers virtually all theorists restricted themselves to the exclusive analysis of
MG versions with fake histories, simply because there is no proper theory yet for MG
versions with real histories, in spite of the fact that these are the more realistic types.
There would thus seem to be merit in a mathematical procedure which would allow
for the derivation of exact dynamical solutions for MGs with real market histories.
The objective of this paper is to develop and apply such a procedure. Models with real
market histories are strongly non-Markovian, so analytical approaches based on pseudo-
equilibrium approximations (which require the existence of a microscopic Lyapunov
function) are ruled out. In contrast, the generating functional analysis (GFA) method of
[17], which has an excellent track record in solving the dynamics of Markovian MGs, will
turn out to work also in the case of non-Markovian models. There are two complications
in developing a GFA for MGs with real histories. Firstly, having real histories implies
that no ‘batch’ version of the dynamics can be defined (since batch models by definition
involve averaging by hand over all possible histories). Thus one has to return to the
original on-line definitions. Secondly, the temporal regularization method [18] upon
which one normally relies in carrying out a GFA of on-line MG versions is no longer
helpful. This regularization is based on the introduction of random durations of the
individual on-line iteration steps of the process, which disrupts the timing of all retarded
microscopic forces and thereby leads to extremely messy equations‡. Thus, one has to
develop the GFA directly in terms of the un-regularized microscopic laws.
This paper is divided into two distinct parts, similar to the more traditional GFA
studies of MGs with fake market histories. The first part deals with the derivation of
closed macroscopic laws from which to solve the canonical dynamic order parameters
for the standard (on-line) MG with true market history. These will turn out to be
formulated in terms of two effective equations (rather than a single equation, as for
models with fake histories): one for an effective agent, and one for an effective overall
market bid. These equations are fully exact. The second part of the paper is devoted to
constructing solutions for these effective processes. In particular, this paper focuses on
the usual persistent observables of the MG and on the distribution of history frequencies,
which are calculated in the form of an expansion of which the first few terms are derived
in explicit form. The final results find excellent confirmation in numerical simulations.
‡ Note that in models with fake histories there are no retarded microscopic forces, so that there this
particular problem could not occur.
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2. Definitions
2.1. Generalized Minority Game with both valuation and overall bid perturbations
In the standard MG one imagines having N agents, labeled by i = 1, . . . , N . At each
iteration step ℓ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} of the game, each agent i submits a ‘bid’ bi(ℓ) ∈ {−1, 1}
to the market. The (re-scaled) cumulative market bid at stage ℓ is defined as
A(ℓ) =
1√
N
N∑
i=1
bi(ℓ) + Ae(ℓ) (1)
An external contribution Ae(ℓ) has been added, representing e.g. the actions of market
regulators, which will enable us to identify specific response functions later. Profit is
assumed to be made by those agents who find themselves subsequently in the minority
group, i.e. when A(ℓ) > 0 by those agents i with bi(ℓ) < 0, and when A(ℓ) < 0 by
those with bi(ℓ) > 0. Each agent i determines his bid bi(ℓ) at each step ℓ on the basis
of publicly available information, which the agents believe to represent historic market
data, here given by the vector λ(ℓ, A, Z) ∈ {−1, 1}M :
λ(ℓ, A, Z) =


sgn[(1− ζ)A(ℓ− 1) + ζZ(ℓ, 1)]
...
sgn[(1− ζ)A(ℓ−M) + ζZ(ℓ,M)]

 (2)
The numbers {Z(ℓ, λ)}, with λ = 1, . . . ,M , are zero-average Gaussian random variables,
which represent a ‘fake’ alternative to the true market data. M is the number of iteration
steps in the past for which market information is made available. We define α = 2M/N ,
and take α to remain finite as N →∞. The parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1] allows us to interpolate
between the cases of strictly true (ζ = 0) and strictly fake (ζ = 1) market histories. We
distinguish between two classes of ‘fake history’ variables:
consistent : Z(ℓ, λ) = Z(ℓ− λ), 〈Z(ℓ)Z(ℓ′)〉 = κ2δℓℓ′ (3)
inconsistent : Z(ℓ, λ) all independent, 〈Z(ℓ, λ)Z(ℓ′, λ′)〉 = κ2δℓℓ′δλλ′ (4)
We note that (4) does not correspond to a pattern being shifted in time, contrary to
what one expects of a string representing the time series of the overall bid, so that the
agents in a real market could easily detect that they are being fooled. Hence (3) seems
a more natural description of fake history. Although fake, it is at least consistently so.
Each agent has S trading strategies, which we label by a = 1, . . . , S. Each strategy
a of each trader i consists of a complete list Ria of 2M recommended trading decisions
{Ria
λ
} ∈ {−1, 1}, covering all 2M possible values of the external information vector λ.
We draw all entries {Ria
λ
} randomly and independently before the start of the game, with
equal probabilities for ±1. Upon observing history string λ(ℓ, A, Z) at stage ℓ, given
a trader’s active strategy at that stage is ai(ℓ), the agent will follow the instruction of
his active strategy and take the decision bi(ℓ) = R
iai(ℓ)
λ(ℓ,A,Z)
. To determine their active
strategies ai(ℓ), all agents keep track of valuations pia(ℓ), which measure how often and
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to what extent each strategy a would have led to a minority decision if it had been used
from the start of the game onwards. These valuations are updated continually, via
pia(ℓ+ 1) = pia(ℓ)− η˜√
N
A(ℓ)Riaλ(ℓ,A,Z) (5)
The factor η˜ represents a learning rate. If the active strategy ai(ℓ) of trader i at stage ℓ
is defined as the one with the highest valuation pia(ℓ) at that point, and upon writing
Fλ[ℓ, A, Z] =
√
αN δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z), our process becomes
pia(ℓ+ 1) = pia(ℓ)− η˜
N
√
α
A(ℓ)
∑
λ
RiaλFλ[ℓ, A, Z] (6)
A(ℓ) = Ae(ℓ) +
1
N
√
α
∑
i
∑
λ
R
iai(ℓ)
λ
Fλ[ℓ, A, Z] (7)
ai(ℓ) = arg max
a∈{1,...,S}
{pia(ℓ)} (8)
We note that (αN)−1
∑
λ 1 = (αN)
−1∑
λF2λ[ℓ, A, Z] = 1. The standard MG is
recovered for ζ → 0 (i.e. true market data only), whereas the ‘fake history’ MG as
in e.g. [4, 9] is found for ζ → 1 (i.e. fake market data only, of the inconsistent type (4)).
Henceforth we will restrict ourselves to the simplest case S = 2, where each agent
has only two strategies, so a ∈ {1, 2}, since the choice made for S has been shown to
have only a quantitative effect on the behaviour of the MG. Our equations can now be
simplified in the standard way upon introducing the new variables
qi(ℓ) =
1
2
[pi1(ℓ)− pi2(ℓ)] (9)
ωi =
1
2
[Ri1 +Ri2], ξi =
1
2
[Ri1 −Ri2] (10)
and Ω = N−1/2
∑
iω
i. The bid of agent i at step ℓ is now seen to follow from
Riai(ℓ) =
1
2
[Ri1 −Ri2] + 1
2
sgn[qi(ℓ)][R
i1 +Ri2]
= ωi + sgn[qi(ℓ)]ξ
i (11)
The above S = 2 formulation is easily generalized to include decision noise: one
simply replaces sgn[qi(ℓ)] → σ[qi(ℓ), zi(ℓ)], in which the {zj(ℓ)} are independent and
zero average random numbers, described by a symmetric and unit-variance distribution
P (z). The function σ[q, z] is taken to be non-decreasing in q for any z, and parametrized
by a control parameter T ≥ 0 such that σ[q, z] ∈ {−1, 1}, with limT→0 σ[q, z] = sgn[q]
and limT→∞
∫
dz P (z)σ[q, z] = 0. Typical examples are additive and multiplicative
noise definitions, described by σ[q, z] = sgn[q + Tz] and σ[q, z] = sgn[q] sgn[1 + Tz],
respectively. The parameter T measures the degree of randomness in the agents’ decision
making, with T = 0 bringing us back to ai(ℓ) = arg maxa{pia(ℓ)}, and with purely
random strategy selection for T =∞.
Upon translating our microscopic laws (6,7) into the language of the valuation
differences (9) for S = 2, we find that now our MG equations close in terms of our
new dynamical variables {qi(ℓ)}, so that perturbations of valuations (again for the
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purpose of defining response functions later) can be implemented simply by replacing
qi(ℓ) → qi(ℓ) + θi(ℓ), with θi(ℓ) ∈ IR. Thus we arrive at the following closed equations,
defining our generalized S = 2 MG process:
qi(ℓ+ 1) = qi(ℓ) + θi(ℓ)− η˜
N
√
α
∑
λ
ξiλFλ[ℓ, A, Z]A(ℓ) (12)
A(ℓ) = Ae(ℓ) +
1√
αN
∑
λ
{
Ωλ+
1√
N
∑
i
σ[qi(ℓ), zi(ℓ)]ξ
i
λ
}
Fλ[ℓ, A, Z] (13)
Fλ[ℓ, A, Z] =
√
αN δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z) (14)
λ(ℓ, A, Z) =


sgn[(1− ζ)A(ℓ− 1) + ζZ(ℓ, 1)]
...
sgn[(1− ζ)A(ℓ−M) + ζZ(ℓ,M)]

 (15)
The values of {A(ℓ), Z(ℓ)} for ℓ ≤ 0 and of the qi(0) play the role of initial conditions.
The key differences at the mathematical level between MG models with fake
history and those with true history as defined above, are in the dependence of the
microscopic laws on the past via the history string {A(ℓ− 1), . . . , A(ℓ−M)} occurring
in λ(ℓ, A, Z) ∈ {−1, 1}M , in combination with the presence and role of the zero-average
Gaussian random variables {Z(ℓ, λ)}.
2.2. Mathematical consequences of having real history
In all generating functional analyses of MGs which have been published so far, the choice
ζ = 1 eliminated with one stroke of the pen the dependence of the process on the history
{A(ℓ− 1), . . . , A(ℓ −M)}. The variables {Z(ℓ, 1), . . . , Z(ℓ,M)} could subsequently be
replaced simply by integer numbers µ, labeling each of the 2M = p = αN possible
‘pseudo-histories’ that could have been drawn at any given time step ℓ. Here this is no
longer possible. The variables {Z(ℓ, λ)} now play the role of random disturbances of the
true market history as perceived by the agents, and there is no reason why all possible
histories should occur (let alone with equal frequencies) or why some entries {Z(ℓ, λ)}
(e.g. those with small values of λ, which corrupt the most recent past in the history
string) could not be more important than others. The problem has become qualitatively
different. One can thus anticipate various mathematical consequences for the generating
functional analysis of introducing history into the MG. An early appreciation of these
will help us to proceed with the calculation more efficiently.
Firstly, we will have to analyze the original on-line version of the MG; the batch
version can no longer exist by definition, since it involves averaging by hand over all
possible ‘histories’ at each iteration step. However, the temporal regularization method
of [18] which was employed successfully for the on-line MG with fake history [10], based
on introducing Poissonnian distributed real-valued random durations for the individual
iterations in (12,13), can in practice no longer be used in the non-Markovian case.
The reason for this is the problem which prompted the authors of [10] to add the
external perturbations θi(ℓ) to the regularized on-line process rather than to the original
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equations: whereas in a Markov chain the introduction of random durations for the
individual iteration steps only implies a harmless uncertainty in where we are on the time
axis, in a system with retarded interactions one would generate very messy equations.
We must therefore proceed with our process as it is, without temporal regularization
(although we will be able to recover the previous theory in the limit ζ → 1, as it
should). It will in fact turn out that the more direct application of the generating
functional method presented in this paper brings the benefit of greater transparency.
For instance, the continuity assumptions underlying our use of saddle-point arguments
in path integrals become much more clear than they were in [10]. As always we continue
to concentrate on the evaluation and disorder averaging of the generating functional
Z[ψ] = 〈ei
∑
ℓ>0
∑
i
ψi(ℓ)σ[qi(ℓ),zi(ℓ)]〉 (16)
The brackets in (16) denote averaging over the stochastic process (12,13), whose
randomness is here caused by the decision noise {z(ℓ)} and the fake history variables
{Z(ℓ, λ)}. Although (16) looks like the corresponding expressions for batch MGs, here
we have to allow for ℓ = O(N). Studying the un-regularized process also implies that one
has to be more careful with finite size corrections. This has consequences in working out
the disorder average of the generating functional: in previous MG versions one needed
only the first two moments of the distribution of the strategy look-up table entries.
Here, although one must still expect only the first two moments to play a role in the
final theory, the need to keep track initially of the finite size correction terms implies
that our equations simplify considerably if, instead of binary strategy entries, we choose
the variables {Ria
λ
} to be zero-average and unit-variance Gaussian variables.
It will turn out that in our analysis of (16) an important role will be played by the
following quantity:
W [ℓ, ℓ′;A,Z] =
1
αN
∑
λ
F [ℓ, A, Z]F [ℓ′, A, Z]
= δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z) (17)
This object is a function of the paths {A} and {Z}, and indicates whether or not the
histories as perceived by the agents at times ℓ and ℓ′ are identical (irrespective of the
extent to which these ‘histories’ are true). Its statistics are trivial in the absence of
history, but will here generally contain information regarding the recurrence of overall
bid trajectories. For reasons of economy we will formulate our theory in terms of
the quantity (17), rather than substitute δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z) directly. This will prevent
unnecessary future repetition, since it will allow for most of the theory to be applied
also to MG models with inner product rather than look-up table definitons for the
agents’ history-to-action conversion [19].
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3. The disorder averaged generating functional
3.1. Evaluation of the disorder average
Rather than first writing the microscopic process in probabilistic form, as in [10], we
will express the generating functional (16) as an integral over all possible joint paths
of the state vector q and of the overall bid A, and insert appropriate δ-distributions to
enforce the microscopic dynamical equations (12,13), i.e.
1 =
∏
iℓ
∫ [
dqˆi(ℓ)
2π
]
e
iqˆi(ℓ)[qi(ℓ+1)−qi(ℓ)−θi(ℓ)+
η˜
N
√
α
∑
λ
ξi
λ
F
λ
[ℓ,A,Z]]A(ℓ)
1 =
∏
ℓ
∫ [
dAˆ(ℓ)
2π
]
e
iAˆ(ℓ)[A(ℓ)−Ae(ℓ)−
1√
αN
∑
λ
{
Ω
λ
+ 1√
N
∑
i
σ[qi(ℓ),zi(ℓ)]ξ
i
λ
}
F
λ
[ℓ,A,Z]
(since our microscopic laws are of an iterative and causal form, they have unique
solutions). To compactify our equations we will use the short-hand si(ℓ) = σ[qi(ℓ), zi(ℓ)].
We can now write the disorder average Z[ψ] of (16) as follows:
Z[ψ] =
∫ ∏
ℓ>0
dA(ℓ)dAˆ(ℓ)
2π
eiAˆ(ℓ)[A(ℓ)−Ae(ℓ)]


×
〈∫ [∏
iℓ
dqi(ℓ)dqˆi(ℓ)
2π
eiqˆi(ℓ)[qi(ℓ+1)−qi(ℓ)−θi(ℓ)]+iψi(ℓ)si(ℓ)
]
(18)
× e
i
N
√
α
∑
λ
∑
iℓ
[
η˜qˆi(ℓ)ξi
λ
A(ℓ)−Aˆ(ℓ)
(
ωi
λ
+si(ℓ)ξi
λ
)]
F
λ
[ℓ,A,Z]
〉
{z,Z}
The brackets 〈. . .〉{z,Z} denote averaging over the Gaussian decision noise and the
pseudo-memory variables, and we have used the abbreviations (10). The short-hand
Du = (2π)−
1
2 e−
1
2
u2 and the previously introduced quantity W [. . .] in (17) allow us to
write the disorder average (over the independently distributed zero-average and unit-
variance Ria
λ
) in the last line of (18) as
e
i
N
√
α
∑
λ
∑
iℓ
...
=
∏
λ
∏
i
∫
Du e
iu
2N
√
α
∑
ℓ[η˜qˆi(ℓ)A(ℓ)−Aˆ(ℓ)[1+si(ℓ)]]Fλ[ℓ,A,Z]
×∏
λ
∏
i
∫
Dv e
iv
2N
√
α
∑
ℓ[η˜qˆi(ℓ)A(ℓ)+Aˆ(ℓ)[1−si(ℓ)]]Fλ[ℓ,A,Z]
= e−
1
4N
∑
ℓℓ′>0W [ℓ,ℓ
′;A,Z]
∑
i[η˜qˆi(ℓ)A(ℓ)−Aˆ(ℓ)si(ℓ)][η˜qˆi(ℓ
′)A(ℓ′)−Aˆ(ℓ′)si(ℓ′)]
× e− 14
∑
ℓℓ′>0 Aˆ(ℓ)W [ℓ,ℓ
′;A,Z]Aˆ(ℓ′) (19)
We next isolate the usual observables L(ℓ, ℓ′) = N−1
∑
i qˆi(ℓ)qˆi(ℓ
′), K(ℓ, ℓ′) =
N−1
∑
i si(ℓ)qˆi(ℓ
′), and C(ℓ, ℓ′) = N−1
∑
i si(ℓ)si(ℓ
′), by inserting appropriate integrals
over δ-distributions. We also use the abbreviations DC = ∏ℓℓ′ [√NdC(ℓ, ℓ′)/√2π]
(similarly for other two-time observables) and DA = ∏ℓ>0[dA(ℓ)/√2π] (similarly
for Aˆ). Initial conditions for the qi(0) are assumed to be of the factorized form
p0(q) =
∏
i p0(qi(0)). In anticipation of issues to arise in subsequent stages of our
analysis, especially those related to the scaling with N of the number of individual
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iterations of the process, we will also define the largest iteration step in the generating
functional as ℓmax. All this allows us to write Z[ψ] in the form
Z[ψ] =
∫
DCDCˆDKDKˆDLDLˆ eiN
∑
ℓℓ′ [Cˆ(ℓ,ℓ
′)C(ℓ,ℓ′)+Kˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)K(ℓ,ℓ′)+Lˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)L(ℓ,ℓ′)]
× eO(ℓ2max logN)
∫
DADAˆ ei
∑
ℓ
Aˆ(ℓ)[A(ℓ)−Ae(ℓ)]
× e 14 η˜
∑
ℓℓ′W [ℓ,ℓ
′;A,Z]{Aˆ(ℓ)K(ℓ,ℓ′)A(ℓ′)+Aˆ(ℓ′)K(ℓ′,ℓ)A(ℓ)}
× e− 14
∑
ℓℓ′W [ℓ,ℓ
′;A,Z]{η˜2A(ℓ)L(ℓ,ℓ′)A(ℓ′)+Aˆ(ℓ)[1+C(ℓ,ℓ′)]Aˆ(ℓ′)}
×
〈∫ ∏
iℓ
[
dqi(ℓ)dqˆi(ℓ)
2π
eiqˆi(ℓ)[qi(ℓ+1)−qi(ℓ)−θi(ℓ)]+iψi(ℓ)si(ℓ)
]
.
∏
i
p0(qi(0))
×∏
i
e−i
∑
ℓℓ′{Lˆ(ℓ,ℓ
′)qˆi(ℓ)qˆi(ℓ′)+Kˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)si(ℓ)qˆi(ℓ′)+Cˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)si(ℓ)si(ℓ′)}
〉
{z,Z}
=
∫
DCDCˆDKDKˆDLDLˆ eN [Ψ+Ω+Φ]+O(ℓ2max logN) (20)
with
Ψ = i
∑
ℓℓ′≤ℓmax
[Cˆ(ℓ, ℓ′)C(ℓ, ℓ′) + Kˆ(ℓ, ℓ′)K(ℓ, ℓ′) + Lˆ(ℓ, ℓ′)L(ℓ, ℓ′)] (21)
Φ =
1
N
log
〈∫
DADAˆ ei
∑
ℓ≤ℓmax Aˆ(ℓ)[A(ℓ)−Ae(ℓ)]
× e− 14
∑
ℓℓ′≤ℓmax W [ℓ,ℓ
′;A,Z]M [ℓ,ℓ′;A,Aˆ]
〉
{Z}
(22)
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
log
〈∫ ℓmax∏
ℓ=0
dq(ℓ)dqˆ(ℓ)
2π

 p0(q(0))
× ei
∑
ℓ≤ℓmax [qˆ(ℓ)[q(ℓ+1)−q(ℓ)−θi(ℓ)]+ψi(ℓ)σ[q(ℓ),z(ℓ)]]−i
∑
ℓℓ′≤ℓmax qˆ(ℓ)Lˆ(ℓ,ℓ
′)qˆ(ℓ′)
× e−i
∑
ℓℓ′≤ℓmax [Cˆ(ℓ,ℓ
′)σ[q(ℓ),z(ℓ)]σ[q(ℓ′),z(ℓ′)]+Kˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)σ[q(ℓ),z(ℓ)]qˆ(ℓ′)]
〉
z
(23)
and with
M [ℓ, ℓ′;A, Aˆ] = η˜2A(ℓ)L(ℓ, ℓ′)A(ℓ′)− η˜[Aˆ(ℓ)K(ℓ, ℓ′)A(ℓ′) + Aˆ(ℓ′)K(ℓ′, ℓ)A(ℓ)]
+ Aˆ(ℓ)[1 + C(ℓ, ℓ′)]Aˆ(ℓ′) (24)
The O(ℓ2max logN) corrections in (20) are constants, which reflect the scaling with N
used in defining the conjugate order parameters.
Compared to the Markovian (fake history) MG versions, we note that Ψ and Ω take
their conventional forms, and that all the complications induced by having true market
history are concentrated in the function Φ[C,K, L], which is now defined in terms of a
stochastic process for the overall bid A(ℓ) rather than being an explicit function of the
order parameters (which had been the situation in all fake history versions of the game),
and in the remaining task to implement an appropriate scaling with N of the time scale
ℓmax. We can now also see the advantage in our earlier decision to define Gaussian rather
than binary look-up table entries. With the N -scaling of ℓmax still pending, instead of
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(19), in the binary case we would have found
e
i
N
√
α
∑
λ
∑
iℓ
...
= e
∑
i
∑
λ
log cos
[
1
2N
√
α
∑
ℓ≤ℓmax[η˜qˆi(ℓ)A(ℓ)−Aˆ(ℓ)[1+si(ℓ)]]Fλ[ℓ,A,Z]
]
× e
∑
i
∑
λ
log cos
[
1
2N
√
α
∑
ℓ≤ℓmax[η˜qˆi(ℓ)A(ℓ)+Aˆ(ℓ)[1−si(ℓ)]]Fλ[ℓ,A,Z]
]
(25)
In this expression we see that, for ℓmax = O(N), the different choices of strategy look-up
table entry distribution will give the same results only for those paths {A,Z} where
the frequency of occurrence each of the 2M possible histories is of order O(N−1). In
the latter case the function Fλ[ℓ, A, Z] scales effectively inside summations over ℓ as
Fλ[ℓ, A, Z] = O(N−
1
2 ), and we return to (19). Thus, for non-Gaussian distributions of
the {Ria
λ
} at this stage of the GFA one either has to carry on with the more complicated
expression (25), which cannot be expressed in terms of the order parameters {C,K, L},
or one has to make further assumptions on the overall bid statistics, which (although
turning out to be correct) require validation a posteriori.
3.2. Canonical time scaling
For the on-line MG with random external information (i.e. with ζ = 1) it is known
that the relevant time scale is ℓmax = O(N). Rather than imposing the time scale
ℓmax = O(N) by hand, it is satisfactory to see that one can also extract this canonical
time scaling from our present equations (20,21,22,23).
For finite ℓmax we immediately find limN→∞Φ = 0 in (22), and our generating
functional will be dominated by the physical saddle-point of limN→∞[Ψ + Ω], giving
Cˆ = Kˆ = Lˆ = 0. This leads to a trivial effective single spin problem, which just
describes a frozen state. This makes perfect sense in view of our definitions (12,13):
individual updates of the variables qi are of order N
− 1
2 , so nothing can change on
time-scales corresponding to only a finite number of iteration steps. Thus our present
equations automatically lead us to the choice ℓmax = O(1/δN), where limN→∞ δN = 0; the
function Φ will indeed scale differently as soon as ℓmax is allowed to diverge with N . We
thus define ℓmax = tmax/δN , where 0 ≤ tmax <∞ (of order N0) and with limN→∞ δN = 0.
In order to obtain well-defined limits at the end in (21), we see that we have to re-scale
our conjugate order parameters according to (Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ) → δN 2(Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ). Furthermore,
for the perturbation fields {θi, ψi} to retain statistical significance they also will have
to be re-scaled in the familiar manner, according to (θi, ψi) → δN−1(θ˜i, ψ˜i) (similar to
[10]). The integrations over order parameters and conjugate order parameters in (20)
will now become path integrals for N →∞§.
It will be convenient to introduce the following effective measure:
〈g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉⋆ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∫∏tmax/δN
ℓ=1 [dq(ℓ)dqˆ(ℓ)]〈Mi[{q, qˆ, z}]g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z∫∏tmax/δN
ℓ=1 [dq(ℓ)dqˆ(ℓ)]〈Mi[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z
(26)
§ This is the point, therefore, where the inevitable continuity assumptions regarding our macroscopic
dynamic observables enter. In the present derivation these take a more transparent form than in [10],
where they were hidden inside the details of the temporal regularization.
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Mi[{q, qˆ, z}] = p0(q(0))eiδN
∑tmax/δN
ℓ=1
qˆ(ℓ)
[
q(ℓ+1)−q(ℓ)
δN
−θ˜i(ℓ)
]
+iδN
∑
ℓ
ψ˜i(ℓ)σ[q(ℓ),z(ℓ)]
× e−iδN
2
∑tmax/δN
ℓℓ′=1
[
Lˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)qˆ(ℓ)qˆ(ℓ′)+Kˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)σ[q(ℓ),z(ℓ)]qˆ(ℓ′)+Cˆ(ℓ,ℓ′)σ[q(ℓ),z(ℓ)]σ[q(ℓ′),z(ℓ′)]
]
(27)
Upon substituting ℓmax = tmax/δN into our equations (21,22,23), followed by appropriate
re-scaling of the conjugate order parameters, these three functions acquire the following
form (modulo irrelevant constants):
Ψ = iδN
2
∑
ℓℓ′≤tmax/δN
[
Cˆ(ℓ, ℓ′)C(ℓ, ℓ′) + Kˆ(ℓ, ℓ′)K(ℓ, ℓ′) + Lˆ(ℓ, ℓ′)L(ℓ, ℓ′)
]
(28)
Φ =
1
N
log
〈∫
DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z]
〉
{Z}
(29)
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
log
∫ tmax/δN∏
ℓ=1
[dq(ℓ)dqˆ(ℓ)] 〈Mi[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z (30)
with
W[A, Aˆ|Z] = ei
∑tmax/δN
ℓ=1
Aˆ(ℓ)[A(ℓ)−Ae(ℓ)]−
1
4
∑tmax/δN
ℓℓ′=1 W [ℓ,ℓ
′;A,Z]M [ℓ,ℓ′;A,Aˆ] (31)
It is clear that Ψ and Ω now have proper N →∞ limits. The canonical choice of δN is
subsequently determined by the mathematical condition that limN→∞Φ[C,K, L] 6= 0,
but finite. It follows that (20) is again dominated by its physical saddle-point, and we
are nearly back in familiar territory.
3.3. The saddle point equations
In order to eliminate the fields {ψi(ℓ), θi(ℓ)}, and thereby simplify our equations, we next
extract the physical meaning of our order parameters from the generating functional by
taking appropriate derivatives with respect to these fields. This gives
C(ℓ, ℓ′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈si(ℓ)si(ℓ′)〉 = 〈σ[q(ℓ), z(ℓ)]σ[q(ℓ′), z(ℓ′)]〉⋆ (32)
G(ℓ, ℓ′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂〈si(ℓ)〉
∂θi(ℓ′)
= −i〈σ[q(ℓ), z(ℓ)]qˆ(ℓ)〉⋆ (33)
0 = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂21
∂θi(ℓ)∂θi(ℓ′)
= −〈qˆ(ℓ)qˆ(ℓ′)〉⋆ (34)
Thus at the physical saddle-point of (20) we have the usual relations L(ℓ, ℓ′) = 0 and
K(ℓ, ℓ′) = iG(ℓ, ℓ′), where G denotes the single-site response function. Upon varying
{Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ} in (20) we reproduce self-consistently the by now standard equations
C(ℓ, ℓ′) = 〈σ[q(ℓ), z(ℓ)]σ[q(ℓ′), z(ℓ′)]〉⋆ (35)
G(ℓ, ℓ′) = − i〈σ[q(ℓ), z(ℓ)]qˆ(ℓ′)〉⋆ (36)
L(ℓ, ℓ′) = 〈qˆ(ℓ)qˆ(ℓ′)〉⋆ = 0 (37)
We turn to variation of the order parameters {C,K, L} in Ψ + Φ (as Ω only depends
on the conjugate order parameters). In working out derivatives of Φ we observe that
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the conjugate bids effectively act as differential operators, i.e. Aˆ(s)→ i∂/∂Ae(s). This
gives us our remaining three saddle point equations:
Cˆ(s, s′) = lim
N→∞
i
4NδN
2
∂2
∂Ae(s)∂Ae(s′)
〈∫DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z] W [s, s′;A,Z]〉
{Z}〈∫DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z]〉
{Z}
(38)
Kˆ(s, s′) = lim
N→∞
−η˜
2NδN
2
∂
∂Ae(s)
〈∫DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z] W [s, s′;A,Z]A(s′)〉
{Z}〈∫DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z]〉
{Z}
(39)
Lˆ(s, s′) = lim
N→∞
−iη˜2
4NδN
2
〈∫DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z] W [s, s′;A,Z]A(s)A(s′)〉
{Z}〈∫DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z]〉
{Z}
(40)
At the physical saddle-point, we may use L = 0 and the symmetry of W [. . .] to simplify
the function M [ℓ, ℓ′;A, Aˆ] which occurs in the measure (31) to
M [ℓ, ℓ′;A, Aˆ] = Aˆ(ℓ)[1 + C(ℓ, ℓ′)]Aˆ(ℓ′)− 2iη˜Aˆ(ℓ)G(ℓ, ℓ′)A(ℓ′) (41)
The generating fields {ψ˜i(ℓ)} are now no longer needed and can be removed. The
perturbations θ˜i are still useful for calculating the response function G, but can be
chosen site-independent, i.e. θ˜i(ℓ) = θ˜(ℓ). The measure (27) will then lose its site
dependence. Also the functions {Ψ,Φ,Ω} have at this stage become obsolete. We may
define a new time t = ℓδN = O(N0), which will be real-valued as N →∞, and we may
take the limit N →∞ in the definitions of our observables. The latter can subsequently
be written in terms of the new real-valued time arguments, C(ℓ, ℓ′) → C(t, t′) (and
similar for the other kernels).
4. The resulting theory
4.1. Simplification of saddle-point equations
We may now summarize our saddle-point equations for {C,G} in the usual compact
way, in terms of an effective single agent process:
C(t, t′) = 〈sgn[q(t)]sgn[q(t′)]〉⋆ G(t, t′) = −i〈sgn[q(t)]qˆ(t′)〉⋆ (42)
with a measure which is defined in terms of path integrals, as in [10] (and with time
integrals running from t = 0 to t = tmax):
〈g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉⋆ =
∫ {dqdqˆ} 〈M [{q, qˆ, z}] g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉
z∫ {dqdqˆ} 〈M [{q, qˆ, z}]〉
z
(43)
M [{q, qˆ, z}] = p0(q(0)) ei
∫
dt qˆ(t)[ ddt q(t)−θ(t)−
∫
dt′Kˆ(t′,t)σ[q(t′),z(t′)]]
× e−i
∫
dtdt′[Lˆ(t,t′)qˆ(t)qˆ(t′)+Cˆ(t,t′)σ[q(t),z(t)]σ[q(t′),z(t′)]] (44)
To find the kernels {Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ} we have to evaluate equations (38,39,40) further,
remembering that the left-hand sides as yet still involve the integer time labels (s, s′),
rather than the continuous times. Now the scaling chosen for δN with N which we
adopt will be crucial. We observe that all complications are contained in the evaluation,
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for large N and for any given realization of the fake market information path {Z}, of
objects of the following general form (with all operators evaluated at the saddle-point):
〈Q[{A}]〉{A|Z} =
∫
DADAˆ W[A, Aˆ|Z] Q[{A}] (45)
We can confirm, by repeating the steps taken in evaluating the disorder-averaged
generating functional Z[ψ] but now for calculating averages of arbitrary functions of
the overall market bid path {A}, that the physical interpretation of the measure (45) is
lim
N→∞
〈Q[{A}]〉 =
〈
〈Q[{A}]〉{A|Z}
〉
{Z}
(46)
Thus (45) defines the asymptotic disorder-averaged probability density for observing a
‘path’ {A} of global bids, for a given realization of the fake history path {Z}. To evaluate
(45) we introduce two path-dependent matrices G[A,Z] and D[A,Z], with entries
G[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ′) =W [ℓ, ℓ′;A,Z]G(ℓ, ℓ′) (47)
D[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ′) =W [ℓ, ℓ′;A,Z][1 + C(ℓ, ℓ′)] (48)
Definition (17) tells us that G[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ′) = G(ℓ, ℓ′) if the ‘history’ observed at stage ℓ is
identical to that observed at stage ℓ′, and zero otherwise, and similarly for the relation
between D[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ′) and 1+C(ℓ, ℓ′). We now use auxiliary integration variables {φℓ}
to linearize the term in the exponent of (45) which is quadratic in Aˆ, and use causality
of the response function G where appropriate:
〈Q[{A}]〉{A|Z} =
∫ tmax/δN∏
ℓ=1
[
dA(ℓ)dAˆ(ℓ)
2π
eiAˆ(ℓ)[A(ℓ)−Ae(ℓ)+
1
2
η˜
∑
ℓ′<ℓG[A,Z](ℓ,ℓ
′)A(ℓ′)]
]
Q[{A}]
×
∫
[
∏tmax/δN
ℓ=1 dφℓ]e
−
∑tmax/δN
ℓℓ′=1 φℓ(D
−1[A,Z])ℓℓ′φℓ′−i
∑tmax/δN
ℓ=1
φℓAˆℓ
∫
[
∏
ℓ dφℓ]e
−
∑tmax/δN
ℓℓ′=1 φℓ(D
−1[A,Z])ℓℓ′φℓ′
=
∫ [ tmax/δN∏
ℓ=1
dA(ℓ)
]
Q[{A}]
×
〈tmax/δN∏
ℓ=1
δ

A(ℓ)− Ae(ℓ) + 1
2
η˜
∑
ℓ′<ℓ
G[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ′)A(ℓ′)− φℓ

〉
{φ|A,Z}
Here 〈. . .〉{φ|A,Z} refers to averaging over the zero-average Gaussian fields φℓ with {A,Z}-
dependent covariance 〈φℓφℓ′〉{φ|A,Z} = 12D[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ′). We conclude from our expression
for 〈Q[{A}]〉{A|Z} that the conditional disorder-averaged probability density P[{A}|{Z}]
for finding a bid path {A}, given a realization {Z} of the pseudo-history, is given by
P[{A}|{Z}] =
〈tmax/δN∏
ℓ=1
δ

A(ℓ)− Ae(ℓ) + 1
2
η˜
∑
ℓ′<ℓ
G(ℓ, ℓ′)W [ℓ, ℓ′;A,Z]A(ℓ′)− φℓ


〉
{φ|A,Z}
(49)
with 〈Q[{A}]〉{A|Z} =
∫
[
∏
ℓ dA(ℓ)]P[{A}|{Z}]Q[{A}]. Causality ensures that the density
(49) is normalized, since both φℓ and G[A,Z](ℓ, ℓ
′) involve only entries of the paths
{A,Z} with times k < ℓ.
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Having established (49), our equations (38,39,40) can be simplified considerably.
We immediately find that Cˆ = 0. To simplify comparison with the theory of [10]
(corresponding to ζ = 1), we will make a final change in notation and put
Kˆ(ℓ, ℓ′) = −αR(ℓ′, ℓ) Lˆ(ℓ, ℓ′) = −1
2
αiΣ(ℓ, ℓ′) (50)
This allows us, with p = αN and in anticipation of our expected time scaling δN = η˜/2p
(known from the analysis in [10] of the Markovian limit ζ = 1), to write the remaining
equations (39,40) in the simple form
R(ℓ, ℓ′) = lim
N→∞
∂
∂Ae(ℓ′)
{
η˜
2pδN
2
〈
〈W [ℓ′, ℓ;A,Z]A(ℓ)〉{A|Z}
〉
{Z}
}
(51)
Σ(ℓ, ℓ′) = lim
N→∞
{
η˜2
2pδN
2
〈
〈W [ℓ, ℓ′;A,Z]A(ℓ)A(ℓ′)〉{A|Z}
〉
{Z}
}
(52)
We see that R defines a response function associated with external bid perturbation,
and hence obeys causality: R(ℓ, ℓ′) = 0 for ℓ′ > ℓ. This, in turn, enables us to simplify
equations (42) for {C,G} and the measure 〈. . .〉⋆ to a form identical to that found in
[10] for the Markovian (‘fake history’) on-line MG:
C(t, t′) = 〈σ[q(t), z(t)]σ[q(t′), z(t′)]〉⋆ (53)
G(t, t′) =
δ
δθ˜(t′)
〈σ[q(t), z(t)]〉⋆ (54)
〈g[{q, z}]〉⋆ =
∫{dq} 〈g[{q, z}] M [{q, z}]〉
z∫{dq} 〈M [{q, z}]〉
z
(55)
M [{q, z}] = p0(q(0))
∫
{dqˆ} e− 12α
∫
dtdt′ Σ(t,t′)qˆ(t)qˆ(t′)
× ei
∫
dt qˆ(t)[ ddtq(t)−θ˜(t)+α
∫
dt′ R(t,t′)σ[q(t′),z(t′)]] (56)
4.2. Summary and interpretation
We recognize that (56) describes the usual effective single-trader equation with
a retarded self-interaction and zero-average Gaussian noise η(t) with covariances
〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = Σ(t, t′):
d
dt
q(t) = θ˜(t)− α
∫ t
0
dt′ R(t, t′) σ[q(t′)] +
√
α η(t) (57)
We have used the fact, as in [10], that the discontinuity of the correlation function
for equal times, i.e. C(t, t) = 1, will in the continuous time limit be irrelevant. This
implies that we may carry out the averages over the decision noise and are left only
with expressions involving σ[q] =
∫
dz P (z)σ[q, z], and that (with the exclusion of t = t′,
where one has C(t, t) = 1) the order parameter equations (53,54) simplify to
C(t, t′) = 〈σ[q(t)]σ[q(t′)]〉⋆ G(t, t′) = δ
δθ˜(t′)
〈σ[q(t)]〉⋆ (58)
Our remaining problem is to solve the order parameters {R,Σ} from (51,52). To
do so we must select the canonical time scale δN such that the N → ∞ limit in
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(51,52) is both non-trivial (i.e. δN sufficiently small) and well-defined (i.e. δN not
too small). For the special value ζ = 1 we know [10] that δN = η˜/2p. Although here
we have followed a different route towards a continuous time description, we show in
Appendix A that indeed δN = η˜/2p, by working out our present equations in detail for
the fake history limit ζ → 1. Given this canonical time scaling and given the definition
W [ℓ, ℓ′;A,Z] = δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z), we find our equations (51,52) taking their final forms:
R(t, t′) = lim
δN→0
δ
δAe(t′)
〈〈
A(ℓ)δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z)
〉〉
{A,Z}
∣∣∣∣
ℓ=t/δN ,ℓ′=t′/δN
(59)
Σ(t, t′) = η˜ lim
δN→0
1
δN
〈〈
A(ℓ)A(ℓ′)δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z)
〉〉
{A,Z}
∣∣∣∣
ℓ=t/δN ,ℓ′=t′/δN
(60)
with δ/δAe(ℓ) = δN
−1∂/∂A(ℓ). Here 〈〈. . .〉〉A,Z refers to an average over the stochastic
process (49) for the overall bids {A} and over the pseudo-history {Z}. The bid evolution
process can be written in more explicit form as
A(ℓ) = Ae(ℓ) + φℓ − 1
2
η˜
∑
ℓ′<ℓ
G(ℓ, ℓ′)δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z) A(ℓ
′) (61)
with the zero-average Gaussian random fields {φ}, characterized by
〈φℓφℓ′〉{φ|A,Z} = 1
2
[1 + C(ℓ, ℓ′)] δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z) (62)
Equation (61) is to be interpreted as follows. For every realization {Z} of the fake
history ‘path’ one iterates (61) to find successive bid values upon generating the zero-
average Gaussian random variables φℓ with statistics (62) (which depend, in turn, on
the recent bid realizations). The result is averaged over the fake history paths {Z}.
Let us now summarize the structure of the present theory describing the MG with
true market history in the limitN →∞, by indicating the similarities and the differences
with the previous theory describing the on-line MG without market history:
similarities between the theory of real and fake history MGs:
• The MG with real history is described again by the effective single agent
equation (57), from which the usual order dynamical order parameters {C,G}
are to be solved self-consistently via (58).
• The scaling with N of the characteristic times in the MG with history is
identical to that of the MG without history, if we avoid highly biased global
bid initializations (where the MG with history acts faster by a factor
√
N).
differences between the theory of real and fake history MGs:
• Real and fake history MGs differ in the retarded self-interaction kernel R and
the noise covariance kernel Σ of the single agent equation. Without history,
{R,Σ} were found as explicit functions of {C,G}. With history they are to be
solved from an effective equation (61) for the evolving global bid.
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the effective global bid process:
• The effective global bid process (61) is itself independent of the stochastic
effective single trader process (57). The two are linked only via the (time
dependent) order parameters occurring in their definitions.
• At each stage in the process (61), the bid A(ℓ) is coupled directly only to bids
in the past at times ℓ′ with identical realization of the M-bit history string. In
addition, only those effective global bid noise variables φℓ are correlated which
correspond to times ℓ with identical realizations of the M-bit history string.
The differences between the two ‘fake history’ definitions (3,4) (i.e. consistent versus
inconsistent) are seen to be limited to the details of the averaging process 〈. . .〉{Z}.
In Appendix A we show how one can recover from (57,61) the earlier theory of [10]
in the fake history limit ζ → 1. This exercise serves two purposes. Firstly, it confirms
that the canonical time scale of our process is indeed given by δN = η˜/2p (modulo an
irrelevant multiplicative constant). More importantly, being the simplest instance of
our presently studied class of MG models, it provides useful intuition on how we might
proceed to find solutions of our effective processes (57,61) in the general case.
5. The role of history statistics
We continue with our analysis of the full MG with history, and next show that all the
effects induced by having real market history can be concentrated in the statistics of
the M-bit memory strings λ of (15). More specifically, the core objects in the theory
will turn out to be the following functions, which measure the joint probability to find
identical histories in the effective global bid process (61) at k specified times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk},
relative to the probability p−k for this to happen in the case of randomly drawn fake
histories and non-identical times:
∆k(ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) = p
k−1
∑
λ
〈〈
k∏
i=1
δλ,λ(ℓi,A,Z) 〉〉{A,Z} (63)
We have abbreviated
∑
λ =
∑
λ∈{−1,1}M , with 2
M = p = αN . For any value of k one
recovers in the random history limit and for non-identical times limζ→1∆k(. . .) = 1. For
k = 1 one has ∆1(ℓ) =
∑
λ〈〈δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z)〉〉{A,Z} = 1, for any ζ . In contrast, for arbitrary
ζ (i.e. when allowing for real histories) and k > 1 the functions (63) are nontrivial.
5.1. Reduction of the kernels {R,Σ}
We will follow as much as possible the steps which we took in Appendix A in order to
recover the ζ = 1 equations (A.9,A.14). We re-write the global bid equation (61) as
∑
ℓ′≤ℓ
{
δℓℓ′ +
1
2
η˜G(ℓ, ℓ′)δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z)
}
A(ℓ′) = Ae(ℓ) + φℓ
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and we formally invert the operator on the left-hand side, using δN = η˜/2p:
A(ℓ) = Ae(ℓ) + φℓ +
∑
r>0
(− η˜
2
)r
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ, ℓ1)G(ℓ1, ℓ2) . . .G(ℓr−1, ℓr)
×
[ r∏
i=1
δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓi,A,Z)
]
[Ae(ℓr) + φℓr ] (64)
Expression (64) is itself not yet a solution of (61), since the bids {A(s)} also occur inside
the history strings λ(ℓ′, A, Z) at the right-hand side. We now insert (64) first into (59),
and consider only infinitesimal external bid perturbations Ae, so that we need not worry
about indirect effects on A(ℓ) of these perturbations via the history strings λ(s, A, Z):
R(t, t′) = δ(t− t′) + lim
δN→0


∑
r>0
(−δN )r−1
∑
ℓ1...ℓr−1
G(ℓ, ℓ1)G(ℓ1, ℓ2) . . . G(ℓr−1, ℓ
′)
× pr
〈〈
δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓ′,A,Z)
r−1∏
i=1
δλ(ℓ,A,Z),λ(ℓi,A,Z)
〉〉
{A,Z}
} ∣∣∣
ℓ= t
δN
,ℓ′= t′
δN
= δ(t− t′) + lim
δN→0


∑
r>0
(−δN )r−1
∑
ℓ1...ℓr−1
G(ℓ0, ℓ1) . . . G(ℓr−1, ℓr)
× ∆r+1(ℓ0, . . . , ℓr)
} ∣∣∣
ℓ0=
t
δN
,ℓr=
t′
δN
(65)
Similarly we can insert (64) into (60), again with Ae → 0, and find
Σ(t, t′) = η˜ lim
δN→0
1
δN


∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ0, ℓ1) . . . G(ℓr−1, ℓr)
× ∑
ℓ′1...ℓ′r
G(ℓ′0, ℓ
′
1) . . .G(ℓ
′
r−1, ℓ
′
r) p
r+r′
〈〈
〈φℓrφℓ′
r′
〉{φ|A,Z}
×
[ r∏
i=1
δλ(ℓ0,A,Z),λ(ℓi,A,Z)
][ r′∏
j=1
δλ(ℓ′0,A,Z),λ(ℓ′j ,A,Z)
] 〉〉
{A,Z}


∣∣∣
ℓ0=
t
δN
,ℓ′0=
t′
δN
= lim
δN→0


∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ0, ℓ1) . . . G(ℓr−1, ℓr)
× ∑
ℓ′1...ℓ
′
r
G(ℓ′0, ℓ
′
1) . . . G(ℓ
′
r−1, ℓ
′
r) [1 + C(ℓr, ℓ
′
r′)]
× ∆r+r′+2(ℓ0, . . . , ℓr, ℓ′0, . . . , ℓ′r′)
} ∣∣∣
ℓ0=
t
δN
,ℓ′0=
t′
δN
(66)
The limits δN → 0 in (65,66) are well-defined, since each time summation combines with
a factor δN to generate an integral, whereas pairwise identical times in (66) leave a ‘bare’
factor δN but will also cause ∆r+r′+2(. . .) to gain a factor p = η˜/2δN in compensation.
Since the single agent process (57) is linked to the global bid process (61) only via
the kernels {R,Σ}, we conclude from (65,66) (which are still fully exact) that the effects
of having true market history are concentrated solely in the resulting history statistics
as described by the functions (63). More specifically, there is no need for us to solve the
global bid process (61) beyond knowing the history statistics which it generates.
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5.2. Time-translation invariant stationary states
In fully ergodic and time-translation invariant states without anomalous response, we
could in ‘fake history’ MG versions find exact closed equations for persistent order
parameters without having to solve for the kernels {C,G} in full, and locate phase
transitions exactly. This suggests that the same may be true for MGs with true history.
Thus we make the standard time-translation invariance (TTI) ansatz for the kernels in
(57) and for the correlation- and response functions:
C(t, t′) = C(t− t′) G(t, t′) = G(t− t′)
R(t, t′) = R(t− t′) Σ(t, t′) = Σ(t− t′)
with χ =
∫∞
0 dt R(t) finite. It turns out that several relations between persistent
observables in TTI stationary states of the present non-Markovian MG process,
if such states again exist, can be established on the basis of (57) alone. Upon
following established notation conventions and abbreviating time averages as f =
limτ→∞ τ
−1
∫ τ
0 dt f(t), we may write the time average of (57) as
dq/dt = θ˜ − αχ
R
σ +
√
α η (67)
with χ
R
=
∫∞
0 dt R(t). We may now define the familiar effective agent trajectories
corresponding to fickle versus frozen agents as those with either dq/dt = 0 or dq/dt 6= 0,
respectively. For frozen agents, consistency demands that sgn[σ] = sgn[dq/dt]. It then
follows from (67) that the (at least for χ
R
> 0 complementary and mutually exclusive)
conditions for having a ‘fickle’ or a ‘frozen’ solution can be written as follows:
fickle : |θ +√αη| ≤ αχ
R
σ[∞], σ = θ˜ +
√
α η
αχ
R
(68)
frozen : |θ +√αη| > αχ
R
σ[∞], σ = σ[∞].sgn
[ θ˜ +√α η
αχ
R
]
(69)
Which solution of (68) and (69) we will find depends on the realization of the noise term
η, which is a frozen Gaussian variable with zero expectation value and with variance
S20 = 〈η2〉⋆ = limτ→∞
1
τ 2
∫ τ
0
dtdt′ Σ(t, t′) = Σ(∞) (70)
We may now proceed as in Appendix A towards the calculation of the persistent order
parameters φ, χ and c, where φ denotes the fraction of frozen agents in the stationary
state, where χ =
∫∞
0 dt G(t), and with
c = lim
t→∞
C(t) = lim
τ→∞
1
τ 2
∫ τ
0
dtdt′ 〈σ[q(t)]σ[q(t′)]〉⋆ = 〈σ2〉⋆ (71)
Upon introducing the short-hand u =
√
αχ
R
σ[∞]/S0
√
2, and upon using the conditions
and relations (68,69), we find in the limit θ˜ → 0 of vanishing external fields:
φ =
∫
dη
S0
√
2π
e−
1
2
η2/S20θ
[
|η| − √αχ
R
σ[∞]
]
= 1− Erf[u] (72)
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c =
∫
dη
S0
√
2π
e−
1
2
η2/S20
{
θ
[
|η| − √αχ
R
σ[∞]
]
σ2[∞]
+ θ
[√
αχ
R
σ[∞]− |η|
] η2
αχ2
R
}
= σ2[∞]
{
1− Erf[u] + 1
2u2
Erf[u]− 1
u
√
π
e−u
2
}
(73)
χ =
∫
dη
S0
√
2π
e−
1
2
η2/S20
∂σ
∂(
√
αη)
= Erf[u]/αχ
R
(74)
Hence, in order to find the TTI stationary solution {φ, c, χ} and the phase transition
point (defined by χ→∞), we only need to extract expressions for χ
R
and S0 from the
stochastic overall bid process (61). Using (65,66), the latter can be written as
χ
R
=
∫ ∞
0
dt R(t)
= 1 + lim
δN→0
{∑
r>0
(−δN )r
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ1 − ℓ2)G(ℓ2 − ℓ3) . . . G(ℓr−1 − ℓr)G(ℓr)
× ∆r+1(ℓ1, . . . , ℓr, 0)
}
(75)
S20 = lim
L→∞
1
L2
∑
ℓ0,ℓ′0≤L
lim
δN→0


∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ0 − ℓ1) . . . G(ℓr−1 − ℓr)
× ∑
ℓ′1...ℓ
′
r
G(ℓ′0 − ℓ′1) . . . G(ℓ′r−1 − ℓ′r) [1 + C(ℓr − ℓ′r′)]
× ∆r+r′+2(ℓ0, . . . , ℓr, ℓ′0, . . . , ℓ′r′)
}
(76)
5.3. TTI states with short history correlation times
Calculating the history statistics kernels (63) from the global bid process (61) is hard, but
in those cases where the history correlation time Lh (measured in individual iterations
ℓ) in the process is much smaller than N , we can make progress in our analysis of TTI
stationary states. We define the asymptotic frequency πλ(A,Z) at which history string
λ occurs in a given realization {A,Z} of our process (61) as
πλ(A,Z) = limL→∞
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z) (77)
Obviously
∑
λ πλ(A,Z) = 1. For ζ = 1 (no history) we would have πλ = p
−1 for all
λ. We may also define the distribution ̺(f) of these asymptotic history frequencies
πλ(A,Z), relative to the benchmark ‘no-memory’ values p
−1, and averaged over the
global bid process (61) in the infinite system size (i.e. continuous time) limit:
̺(f) = lim
p→∞
1
p
∑
λ
〈〈δ[f − pπλ(A,Z)]〉〉{A,Z} (78)
Our definitions guarantee that
∫∞
0 df f̺(f) = 1 for any ζ . For ζ = 1 we simply recover
̺(f) = δ[f − 1], i.e. all histories occur equally frequently. We have not yet shown that
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Figure 1. Typical examples of history frequency distributions (78) as measured in
simulations of the on-line MG without decision noise but with full history (i.e. ζ = 0),
after equilibration. Here N = 8193. Left: α = 0.125 (in the non-ergodic regime of the
MG, below αc). Right: α = 2.0 (in the ergodic regime, above αc).
the limit in (78) exists, i.e. that the history frequencies do indeed generally scale as
πλ(A,Z) = O(N−1). Numerical simulations, however, confirm quite convincingly that
this ansatz is indeed correct (see e.g. Figure 1).
If Lh is the history correlation time in the process (61), then finite samples of history
occurrence frequencies can be expected to approach the asymptotic value (77) as
1
2L
ℓ+L∑
ℓ′=ℓ−L
δλ,λ(ℓ′,A,Z) = πλ(A,Z)
[
1 +O((Lh/L) 12 )
]
(79)
This implies that in expressions such as (75), where G(ℓ)− G(ℓ′) = O(|ℓ− ℓ′|/N) and
where only time strings {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} with mutual temporal separations of order O(N)
will survive the limit δN → 0, we may choose e.g. L =
√
LhN and effectively replace
∆r+1(ℓ1, . . . , ℓr, 0) → pr
∑
λ
[
πλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
]r+1
(80)
This results in
χ
R
= lim
p→∞
1
p
∑
λ
∑
r≥0
(−χ)r
[
pπλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/L)]
]r+1
= lim
p→∞
1
p
∑
λ
pπλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
1 + χ pπλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
=
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)
f
1 + χf
(81)
(provided indeed limN→∞ Lh/N = 0). The same simplification to an expression involving
only the distribution ̺(f) can be achieved in (76), but there we have to be more careful
in dealing with the occurrences of similar or identical times in the argument of (63). We
first rewrite (76) by transforming the iteration times according to
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , r} : ℓi =
r∑
j=i
sj
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This gives, using lims→∞G(s) = 0 (i.e. restricting ourselves to ergodic states with
normal response):
S20 = lim
δN→0
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
s0...sr−1>0
G(s0) . . .G(sr−1)
∑
s′0...s
′
r′−1>0
G(s′0) . . . G(s
′
r−1)
× lim
L→∞
1
L2
L−
∑r−1
i=0
si∑
sr=0
L−
∑r′−1
i=0
s′i∑
s′
r′=0
[1 + C(sr − s′r′)]
× ∆r+r′+2(s0 + . . .+ sr, . . . , ℓr−1+ ℓr, ℓr, ℓ′0+ . . .+ ℓr′, . . . , ℓ′r′−1+ ℓ′r′ , ℓ′r′)
Each time summation is compensated either by a factor δN (giving an integral), or
limited in range by L and compensated by an associated factor L−1, so that any ‘pairing’
where two (or more) times are close to each other (relative to the correlation time Lh)
will not survive the combined limits δN → 0 and L→∞. Thus we may again put
∆r+r′+2(. . . . . .) → pr+r′+1
∑
λ
[
πλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
]r+r′+2
(82)
and find, with C(∞) = c:
S20 = (1 + c) limp→∞
1
p
∑
λ
∑
r,r′≥0
(−χ)r+r′
[
pπλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
]r+r′+2
= (1 + c) lim
p→∞
1
p
∑
λ
[
pπλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
]2
[
1 + χ pπλ[1 +O(
√
Lh/N)]
]2
= (1 + c)
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)
f 2
(1 + χf)2
(83)
Since only χ
R
and S0 are needed to solve our effective single agent process in TTI
stationary states, we see that upon making the ansatz of short history correlation times
Lh ≪ N the effects of history on the persistent order parameters in the MG are fully
concentrated in the distribution ̺(f) of history frequencies, as defined by (78). Once
̺(f) has been extracted from the process (61), the TTI order parameters are given by
the solution of the following set of equations:
u =
σ[∞]√αχ
R
S0
√
2
χ =
1− φ
αχ
R
φ = 1− Erf[u] (84)
c = σ2[∞]
{
1− Erf[u] + 1
2u2
Erf[u]− 1
u
√
π
e−u
2
}
(85)
χ
R
=
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)
f
1 + χf
(86)
S20 = (1 + c)
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)
f 2
(1 + χf)2
(87)
For ζ = 1 (the fake history limit) we have ̺(f) = δ[f−1], leading to χ
R
= (1+χ)−1 and
S0 =
√
1 + c/(1 + χ), and the above equations are seen to reduce to the corresponding
ones in [10], as they should.
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6. Calculating the history statistics
Upon making the ansatz of short history correlation times in the MG, we have
shown that finding closed equations for persistent TTI order parameters boils down to
calculating the distribution ̺(f) of relative history frequencies, as defined in (78)‖. Our
remaining programme of analysis is: (i) finding an expression for ̺(f), (ii) expressing
this distribution in terms of the persistent order parameters {c, φ, χ, χ
R
, S0}, and (iii)
confirming retrospectively the consistency of assuming short history correlation times.
6.1. The moments of ̺(f)
The distribution (78) is generated by the non-Markovian process (61), which we cannot
hope to solve directly. However, we can get away with a self-consistent calculation which
does not require solving (61) in full. We focus on the moments µk of the distribution ̺,
from which the latter can always be recovered (if the integrals below exist):
µk =
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)fk (88)
̺(f) =
∫ dω
2π
eiωf
∑
k≥0
µk
k!
(−iω)k (89)
Obviously µ0 = µ1 = 1, for any ζ , which follows directly from definition (78). In the
absence of history (i.e. ζ = 1) we have ̺(f) = δ[f − 1], so that µk = 1 for all k ≥ 0.
We will rely on the sum over moments in (89) converging on scales of k which are
independent of N . This is equivalent to saying that the limit (78) is well-defined, so it
does not restrict us further. By combining the definitions (77,78,88) and (15), we can
obtain a more explicit but still relatively simple expression for the moments µk:
µk =
1
p
∑
λ
〈〈[pπλ(A,Z)]k〉〉{A,Z}
= lim
L→∞
pk
Lk
L∑
ℓ1...ℓk=1
〈〈 M∏
i=1
{1
2
∑
λ=±1
k∏
j=1
δλ,λi(ℓj ,A,Z)
}〉〉
{A,Z}
= lim
L→∞
pk−1
Lk
L∑
ℓ1...ℓk=1
〈〈 M∏
i=1
{ k∏
j=1
δ1,λi(ℓj ,A,Z) +
k∏
j=1
δ−1,λi(ℓj ,A,Z)
}〉〉
{A,Z}
(90)
The average 〈〈. . .〉〉{A,Z} in the last line of (90) equals the following joint probability:
〈〈. . .〉〉{A,Z} = Prob
[ {
λ1(ℓ1, A, Z) = λ1(ℓ2, A, Z) = . . . = λ1(ℓk, A, Z)
}
and
{
λ2(ℓ1, A, Z) = λ2(ℓ2, A, Z) = . . . = λ2(ℓk, A, Z)
}
...
and
{
λM(ℓ1, A, Z) = λM(ℓ2, A, Z) = . . . = λM(ℓk, A, Z)
}]
(91)
‖ A similar conclusion was reached also in [15], but on the basis of several approximations. Furthermore,
in contrast to the present GFA approach, in [15] there was no way to calculate ̺(f) from the theory.
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Let us define the short-hand
Same(i) =
{
λi(ℓ1, A, Z) = λi(ℓ2, A, Z) = . . . = λi(ℓk, A, Z)
}
(92)
which states that the i-th component of the history string takes the same value at the
k specified times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}. Given that our bid process obeys causality¶, statement
(91) can be written as
〈〈. . .〉〉{A,Z} = Prob
[
Same(1) ∧ Same(2) ∧ . . . ∧ Same(M)
]
= Prob[Same(1) | Same(2) ∧ . . . ∧ Same(M)]
× Prob[Same(2) | Same(3) ∧ . . . ∧ Same(M)]
...
× Prob[Same(M−1) | Same(M)]
× Prob[Same(M)] (93)
Since we need not consider values of k which scale with N or L, the contributions to
(90) from those times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} for which there are correlations between objects at
a time ℓr and those at another time ℓr′ will vanish in the limit L → ∞. Since we also
know that we are in a TTI state, it follows that the conditional probabilities in (93) will
not depend on the actual values {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}. In the limit L→∞ we may replace
Prob[Same(r) | Same(r + 1) ∧ . . . ∧ Same(M)] → P[k|M−r]
where P[k|m] denotes the probability to find for randomly drawn and infinitely separated
times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} that λi(ℓ1, A, Z) = . . . = λi(ℓk, A, Z), for an index i, given that the
identity holds for the indices {i+1, . . . , i+m} (with P[k|0] giving this probability in the
absence of conditions). This allows us to write (90) as
µk = p
k−1 P[k|M−1].P[k|M−2] . . . P[k|1].P[k|0] (94)
As a simple test one may verify (94) for the trivial case ζ = 1 (fake history only). Here
conditioning on the past is irrelevant, so P[k|m] = P[k|0] = 21−k for all m, which indeed
gives us µk = p
k−12(1−k)M = 1 (as it should). In the continuous time limit N → ∞
(equivalently: for M →∞, since 2M = αN) we thus find the as yet exact formula
lim
M→∞
log(µk) = lim
M→∞
M−1∑
r=0
log
[
2k−1P[k|r]
]
(95)
6.2. Reduction to history coincidence statistics
Next we have to find an expression for the probabilities P[k|r]. We know from (61,62)
that the value of the overall bid at any time ℓ is only correlated with the bid value at time
ℓ′ if the two times (ℓ, ℓ′) have identical history strings, i.e. if λ(ℓ, A, Z) = λ(ℓ′, A, Z).
¶ We here use the fact that a component λi(ℓ, A, Z) of the history string observed by the agents at
time ℓ is by construction (see definition (15)) referring to the overall bid at time ℓ − i. It follows that
the probability of finding a given value for λi(ℓ, A, Z) depends via causality only on the bids at the
earlier times {ℓ− i− 1, ℓ− i− 2, . . .}, hence on {λi+1(ℓ, A, Z), λi+2(ℓ, A, Z), . . .}.
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We know that individual histories show up during the process with probabilities of order
N−1. Since the likelihood of finding recurring histories during any number r = O(M)
of consecutive iterations of our process is thus vanishingly small (of order O(M/N))
such direct correlations are of no consequence in our calculation. The only relevant
effect of conditioning in the sense of the P[k|r] is via its biasing of histories in subsequent
iterations. Although the probability of history recurrence during a time window of
size O(M) is vanishingly small, if two (short) instances of global bid trajectories are
found to have identical realizations of some of the bits of their history strings, they will
nevertheless be more likely than average to have an identical history realization in the
next time step. This is the subtle statistical effect which, together with the resulting
biases in the bids which are subsequently found at times with specific histories, gives
rise to the relative history frequency distributions ̺(f) as observed in e.g. Fig. 1.
The statement that the conditioning in P[k|r] acts only via the joint likelihood of
finding specific histories {λ1, . . . ,λk} at the k specified (and widely separated) times
{ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}, translates into
P[k|r] =
∑
λ1,...λk
P[k|λ1, . . . ,λk] P[λ1, . . . ,λk|r] (96)
Here P[k|λ1, . . . ,λk] denotes the likelihood to find λ(ℓ1, A, Z) = . . . = λ(ℓk, A, Z), if
the history strings at those k times equal {λ1, . . . ,λk}, and P[λ1, . . . ,λk|r] denotes the
likelihood of finding those k specific histories given that the bits of the k history strings
have been identical over the r most recent iterations+. The probability of finding specific
bid values A(ℓ) will in TTI states only depend on the history string λ associated with
time ℓ. Given this history string, A(ℓ) is a Gaussian variable (this follows from the
effective bid process (61)), with some average Aλ and a variance σ
2
λ
(which will in due
course have to be calculated). Using also the fact that the Z(ℓ, i) were defined as zero
average Gaussian variables, with variance κ2, we obtain:
P[k|λ1, . . . ,λk] =
k∏
j=1
[ ∫
DZ
∫
dA Pλj(A)θ[(1− ζ)A+ ζZ]
]
+
k∏
j=1
[ ∫
DZ
∫
dA Pλj (A)θ[−(1− ζ)A− ζZ]
]
=
k∏
j=1

12 +
1
2
Erf
[ (1− ζ)Aλj√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λj
]
+
k∏
j=1

12 −
1
2
Erf
[ (1− ζ)Aλj√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λj
] (97)
We now write the sum over all combinations of histories in (96) in terms of a partitioning
+ Here one will find that consistent and inconsistent realizations of the history noise variables Z(ℓ, i)
are to be treated differently: in the case of consistent noise, one will always have λi(ℓ, A, Z) =
λi+1(ℓ+ 1, A, Z). This is not true for inconsistent history noise.
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in groups, where two M-bit strings {λi,λj} are in the same group if and only if they
are identical. We write (g1, g2, . . .) for the subset of all combinations {λ1, . . . ,λk} with
one group of size g1, a second group of size g2, and so on
∗. Clearly g1 + g2 + . . . = k,
for all possible subsets of our partitioning. This allows us to write
P[k|r] =
∑
(g1,g2,...)
δk,g1+g2+...P[k|g1, g2, . . .] P[g1, g2, . . . |r] (98)
According to (97), the distribution P[k|g1, g2, . . .] is of the relatively simple form
P[k|g1, g2, . . .] = 21−kΦ(g1, g2, . . .), with
Φ(g1, g2, . . .) =
1
2
∏
j≥1


∑
λ
πλ

1 + Erf[ (1− ζ)Aλ√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λ
]
gj


+
1
2
∏
j≥1


∑
λ
πλ

1− Erf[ (1− ζ)Aλ√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λ
]
gj

 (99)
Insertion of the representation (98) for P[k|r] into (95) allows us to write the moments
of the relative history frequencies in the following form:
lim
M→∞
log(µk) = lim
M→∞
M−1∑
r=0
log

 ∑
(g1,g2,...)
δk,g1+g2+...Φ(g1, g2, . . .)P[g1, g2, . . . |r]

 (100)
It will be helpful to assess which values of r in (100) can survive the limit M → ∞.
Whenever we have a value r such that M−r→∞ as M→∞, the condition that the
k history bits were identical over the most recent r steps still leaves a large O(2M−r)
number of compatible history strings to be found at the probing times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}, so
the likelihood of finding histories coinciding in multiples (g1, g2, . . .) scales as
P[g1, g2, . . . |r] =
∏
j|gj>1
O(2(gj−1)(r−M)), P[1, 1, . . . |r] = 1 +O(2r−M)
Since k is finite and Φ(1, 1, 1, . . .) = 1, the total contribution to log(µk) from those terms
where M − r →∞ as M →∞ is negligible, since for 1≪ R≪M we may write
R−1∑
r=0
log
[ ∑
(g1,g2,...)
δk,g1+g2+...Φ(g1, g2, . . .)P[g1, g2, . . . |r]
]
=
R−1∑
r=0
log
[
1 +O(2r−M)
]
= O(2R−M ) (101)
Hence in (100) we need only those terms where M − r is finite. These terms represent
contributions where virtually all past components of the history strings at the times
{ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} were identical, which should indeed constrain the possible histories at the
times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} most, and indeed gives the largest history coincidence rates. We
consequently switch our conditioning label from the number r of previously identical
components to the number M − r of unconstrained components, and write
P[g1, g2, . . . |r] = Q[g1, g2, . . . |M − r]
∗ For example: (k) denotes the subset of all combinations {λ1, . . . ,λk} where λ1 = . . . = λk,
(2, 1, 1, . . .) is the subset of all {λ1, . . . ,λk} where precisely two history strings are identical, and
all others are distinct.
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and find (100) converting into the simpler form
lim
M→∞
log(µk) =
∑
r≥1
log
[ ∑
(g1,g2,...)
δk,g1+g2+...Φ(g1, g2, . . .)Q[g1, g2, . . . |r]
]
(102)
We are left with the task to calculate the likelihood Q[g1, g2, . . . |r] of finding at the k
distinct times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} of our process the histories {λ1, . . . ,λk} to be identical in
prescribed multiples of (g1, g2, . . .), given that the bits of the k history vectors were
identical during all but r of the most recent iterations.
At this stage we benefit from having to consider only values of r in (102) which are
finite (compared toM , which is sent to infinity). For each value r of the number of ‘free’
components, there will be only 2r possible history strings λ available to be allocated to
the k times {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}. In principle one would have to worry about the probabilities
to be assigned to each of the 2r options. However, we know for the full M-component
history strings that their probabilities scale as πλ = fλp
−1 with fλ = O(1), so the
effective probabilities of individual components of λ ∈ {−1, 1} must scale as
πλi = O(π1/Mλ ) = O(
1
2
f
1/M
λ
) =
1
2
[1 +O(M−1)]
From this we deduce that for finite r we may take all 2r allowed history strings to
have equal probabilities. This turns the evaluation of Q[g1, g2, . . . |r] into a solvable
combinatorial problem. Each of k elements is given randomly one of 2r colours (where
each colour has probability 2−r), and Q[g1, g2, . . . |r] represents the likelihood of finding
identical colour sets of sizes (g1, g2, . . .). Let us abbreviate R = 2
r, and write the r-th
term in (102) as log(Hr). Now, using 2
−r(g1+...gR) = 2−rk = R−k we may simply write♯
lim
M→∞
log(µk) =
∑
r≥1
logHr (103)
Hr =
∑
(g1,g2,...)
Φ(g1, g2, . . .)Q[g1, g2, . . . |r]
=
k∑
g1=0
k−g1∑
g2=0
k−g1−g2∑
g3=0
. . .
k−g1−...−gR−1∑
gR=0
Φ(g1, g2, . . .) δk,
∑
i
gi
×R−k
(
k
g1
)(
k − g1
g2
)(
k − g1 − g2
g3
)
. . .
(
k − g1 − . . .− gR−1
gR
)
(104)
6.3. Expansion of sign-coincidence probabilities
Having simplified the conditional distribution Q[g1, g2, . . . |r] of history coincidences, we
turn to Φ(g1, g2, . . .) as given by (99). If we restrict ourselves to an expansion of (99) in
powers of the (random) bid biases Aλ in which we retain only the leading terms, our
♯ One easily confirms that our expression for Hr is properly normalized. Upon choosing Φ(g1, g2, . . .) =
1 one can perform the summations iteratively, starting from gR and descending down to g1, which leads
exactly to the factor Rk to combine with the R−k present.
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problem simplifies further to the point where we can obtain a fully explicit expression
for the moments µk. In Appendix B we derive the following compact relations:
Φ(1, 1, 1, . . .) = 1 (105)
Φ(g1, g2, . . .) = e
1
2
Ω
∑
j≥1 gj(gj−1)−
1
4
Ω2
∑
j
gj(gj−1)(2gj−3)+O(Ω3) (106)
Ω =
∑
λ
πλ Erf
2
[ (1− ζ)Aλ√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λ
]
(107)
The results (105,106) imply that, rather than knowing the full probability distribution
P[g1, g2, . . . |r] in (100), we only need the (conditional) statistics of a modest number
of relatively simple monomials. Expanding the exponential in (106) up to the relevant
orders, and using
∑
j gj = k (which is always true inside (104)) produces
Φ(g1, g2, . . .) = 1 +
1
2
Ω
[∑
j≥1
g2j − k
]
(108)
+
1
4
Ω2
[1
2
∑
ij≥1
g2i g
2
j − 2
∑
j≥1
g3j − (k − 5)
∑
j≥1
g2j +
1
2
k2− 3k
]
+O(Ω3)
Since the combinatorial averaging process of (104) in this particular representation
involves a measure which is invariant under permutations of the numbers {g1, g2, . . .},
the average of (108) is identical to that of the following simpler function (with R = 2r):
Φeff(g1, g2, . . .) = 1 +
1
2
Ω(Rg21 − k) (109)
+
1
8
Ω2
[
Rg41 +R(R− 1)g21g22 − 4Rg31 − 2(k − 5)Rg21 + k2− 6k
]
+O(Ω3)
Instead of having to use full combinatorial measure (104), we can therefore extract all
the relevant information from the (joint) marginal distribution for the pair (g1, g2) only.
Inserting (109) into (104) gives us
Hr = 1 +
1
2
Ω
[
RGk,R2,0 − k
]
+
1
8
Ω2
[
RGk,R4,0 +R(R− 1)Gk,R2,2
− 4RGk,R3,0 − 2(k − 5)RGk,R2,0 + k2− 6k
]
+O(Ω3) (110)
with
Gk,Ra,b =
k∑
g1=0
k−g1∑
g2=0
k−g1−g2∑
g3=0
. . .
k−g1−...−gR−1∑
gR=0
ga1g
b
2 δk,
∑
i
gi
× R−k
(
k
g1
)(
k − g1
g2
)(
k − g1 − g2
g3
)
. . .
(
k − g1 − . . .− gR−1
gR
)
= R−k
k∑
g1=0
k−g1∑
g2=0
(
k
g1
)(
k − g1
g2
)
(R − 2)k−g1−g2ga1gb2 (111)
Those combinatorial factors Gk,Ra,b which we need in order to evaluate (110) are calculated
in Appendix C. They are found to be
Gk,R2,0 =
k
R
+
k(k − 1)
R2
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Figure 2. Test of the predicted history frequency distributions (116) (left picture,
based on expansion of the moments µk up to first order in the width, µk =
e
1
2
Ωk(k−1)) and (118) (right picture, based on expansion up to second order, µk =
e
1
2
Ωk(k−1)− 1
12
Ω2k(k−1)(2k−3)), together with the data of Fig. 1 as measured in
simulations for α = 2.0 and N = 8193. In both cases the second moment which
parametrizes (116) and (118) was taken from the data: µ2 ≈ 1.380.
Gk,R3,0 =
k
R
+
3k(k − 1)
R2
+
k(k − 1)(k − 2)
R3
Gk,R4,0 =
k
R
+
7k(k − 1)
R2
+
6k(k − 1)(k − 2)
R3
+
k(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)
R4
Gk,R2,2 =
k(k − 1)
R2
+
2k(k − 1)(k − 2)
R3
+
k(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)
R4
Insertion of these factors into (110), followed by restoration of the short-hand R = 2r,
gives us the fully explicit expression
Hr = 1 +
1
2
Ωk(k − 1)2−r + 1
8
Ω2k(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)4−r +O(Ω3) (112)
We can now write explicit formulae for the moments of the relative history frequencies,
and hence also for the distribution ̺(f) itself, in the form an expansion in a parameter
Ω which controls the width of this distribution.
6.4. Resulting prediction for ̺(f)
The result (112), together with the earlier relation (103) and the geometric series leads
us finally to the desired expression for the moments µk:
lim
M→∞
log(µk) =
1
2
Ωk(k − 1)− 1
12
Ω2k(k − 1)(2k − 3) +O(Ω3) (113)
We see that this general formula obeys µ0 = µ1 = 1, as it should, and that
lim
M→∞
µ2 = e
Ω− 1
6
Ω2+O(Ω3) (114)
Insertion into our earlier expression (89) for ̺(f) leads in the limitM →∞ to a formula
in which, at least up the relevant orders in Ω, the insertion of a Gaussian integral allows
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us to carry out the summation over moments explicitly:
̺(f) =
∫
dω
2π
eiωf
∑
k≥0
(−iω)k
k!
e
1
2
Ωk(k−1)− 1
12
Ω2k(k−1)(2k−3)+O(Ω3)
=
∫
Dz
∫
dω
2π
eiωf
∑
k≥0
(−iω)k
k!
[
1− 1
6
√
Ω
d3
dz3
+ . . .
]
ezk
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2− 1
2
k(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2)
=
∫
Dz
[
1 +
1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3) + . . .
]
δ
[
f − ez
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2− 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2)
]
(115)
We may use (114) to express Ω in terms of µ2, turning our expansion of the moments
µk into an expansion in powers of log(µ2). Depending on whether we wish to take our
expansion only to order O(log(µ2)), or also to O(log2(µ2)), we obtain
to O(log(µ2)) : ̺(f) = e
− 1
2
z2(f)
f
√
2π log(µ2)
(116)
z(f) =
log(f) + 1
2
log(µ2)√
log(µ2)
(117)
to O(log2(µ2)) : ̺(f) =
e−
1
2
z2(f)
[
1 + 1
6
√
log(µ2)(3z(f)− z3(f))
]
f
√
2π[log(µ2) + log
2(µ2)]
(118)
z(f) =
log(f) + 1
2
[ log(µ2) +
2
3
log2(µ2)]√
log(µ2) + log
2(µ2)
(119)
The two statements (116) and (118) are indeed found to constitute increasingly accurate
predictions for the actual distribution of the relative history frequencies, see e.g. Fig.
2. We have thus been able to explain the origin and the characteristics of the observed
history frequency statistics. However, both formulae are expansions for small Ω. Should
(118) be applied to values of Ω which are not small, one has to be careful in dealing with
large values of f , where ̺(f) could become negative (this would have been prevented
by the higher orders in Ω). The implication is that in the Gaussian integral (115) one
must in practice either introduce a cut-off zc = O(Ω−1/6), or exponentiate the factor
[1 + 1
6
√
log(µ2)(3z(f)− z3(f))].
6.5. The width of ̺(f)
What remains in order to round off our analysis of the distribution of relative history
frequencies is to calculate the width parameter Ω in (113) self-consistently from our
equations. According to our theory, Ω is given by (107), i.e. by
Ω =
∑
λ
πλ Erf
2
[ (1− ζ)Aλ√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λ
]
(120)
The quantities Aλ and σ
2
λ
= A2λ − Aλ describe the statistics of those bids which
correspond to times with a prescribed history string λ. We know from (64) that these
are Gaussian variables, which implies that Aλ and σ
2
λ
are all we need to know. Since we
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restrict ourselves to non-anomalous TTI states, we can write both as long-time averages:
Aλ = π
−1
λ
lim
L→∞
L−1
L∑
ℓ=1
δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z)A(ℓ) (121)
A2λ = π
−1
λ
lim
L→∞
L−1
L∑
ℓ=1
δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z)A
2(ℓ) (122)
We can work out the average Aλ, using (64) and time-translation invariance, and
subsequently define the new time variables si = ℓi − ℓi+1 (for i < r) and sr = ℓr
(so that ℓj = sj + sj+1 + . . .+ sr). This results in
Aλ = limL→∞
1
Lpπλ
L∑
ℓ0=1
∑
r≥0
(−δN )r
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ0− ℓ1) . . . G(ℓr−1− ℓr)
×
[ r∏
i=0
pδλ,λ(ℓi,A,Z)
]
φℓr
=
1
pπλ
∑
r≥0
(−δN )r
∑
s0...sr−1
G(s0) . . . G(sr−1)
lim
L→∞
1
L
L−
∑
i<r
si∑
sr=0
[ r∏
i=0
pδλ,λ(si+...+sr ,A,Z)
]
φsr (123)
Given our ansatz of short history correlation times, in the sense of (79), and given
χ =
∑
ℓ>0G(ℓ) < ∞ (so G(ℓ) must decay sufficiently fast), we find this expression
simplifying to
Aλ =
∑
r≥0
(−χpπλ)r limL→∞
1
πλL
L∑
s=0
δλ,λ(s,A,Z)φs =
φλ
1 + χpπλ
(124)
In a similar manner we find
A2λ = limL→∞
1
πλL
L∑
ℓ0ℓ′0=0
δλ,λ(ℓ0,A,Z)A(ℓ0)A(ℓ
′
0)δℓ0ℓ′0
= lim
L→∞
1
πλL
L∑
ℓ0ℓ′0=0
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
ℓ1...ℓr
G(ℓ0− ℓ1) . . . G(ℓr−1− ℓr)
× ∑
ℓ′1...ℓ′r
G(ℓ′0− ℓ′1) . . . G(ℓ′r′−1− ℓ′r′)δλ,λ(ℓ0,A,Z)
×
[ r∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(ℓi,A,Z)
][ r′∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(ℓ′i,A,Z)
]
δℓ0ℓ′0φℓrφℓ′r′
=
1
pπλ
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
s0...sr−1
G(s0) . . . G(sr−1)
∑
s′0...s
′
r′−1
G(s′0) . . . G(s
′
r′−1)
× lim
L→∞
1
L
L−
∑
i<r
si∑
sr=0
L−
∑
i<r′ s
′
i∑
s′
r′=0
pδλ,λ(s0+...+sr,A,Z)
×
[ r∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(si+...+sr,A,Z)
][ r′∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(s′i+...+s′r′ ,A,Z)
]
δ∑
i
si,
∑
i
s′i
φsrφs′
r′
(125)
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Again we use
∑
ℓG(ℓ) <∞ to justify that in the summations over sr and s′r′ the upper
limit can safely be replaced by L. Thus:
A2λ =
1
pπλ
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
s0...sr−1
G(s0) . . . G(sr−1)
∑
s′0...s
′
r′−1
G(s′0) . . . G(s
′
r′−1)
× lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
sr=0
pδλ,λ(
∑
j
sj ,A,Z)
[ r∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(
∑
j≥i sj ,A,Z)
]
×
[ r′∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(
∑
j
sj−
∑
j<i
s′j ,A,Z)
]
φsrφ
∑
j
sj−
∑
j<r′ s
′
j
(126)
The present calculation is similar to that of the volatility matrix in the fake history online
MG [10] (the quantity σ2
λ
= A2λ−A
2
λ can be regarded as a conditional volatility, where
the condition is that in collecting our statistics we are to restrict ourselves to those times
where the observed history strings take the value λ), so also here we have to worry about
pairwise time coincidences. Each such coincidence effectively removes one constraint of
the type δλ,λ(...,A,Z), since the latter will be met automatically. The remaining terms
will occur in extensive summations, so that we may replace each ‘unpaired’ occurrence
of a factor δλ,λ(...,A,Z), except for those with the same argument as one of the Gaussian
variables φ, by its time average πλ. In practice this implies the replacement
[ r−1∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(
∑
j≥i sj ,A,Z)
][ r′−1∏
i=1
pδλ,λ(
∑
j
sj−
∑
j<i
s′j ,A,Z)
]
→
(pπλ)
r+r′−2π
−
∑r−1
i=1
∑r′−1
j=1
δ∑
ℓ≥i sℓ,
∑
ℓ
sℓ−
∑
ℓ<j
s′
ℓ
λ
= (pπλ)
r+r′−2
r−1∏
i=1
r′−1∏
j=1
[
1 +
1− πλ
pπλ
η˜
2δN
δ∑
ℓ<i
sℓ,
∑
ℓ<j
s′
ℓ
]
(127)
and therefore
A2λ =
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
s0...sr−1
G(s0) . . .G(sr−1)
∑
s′0...s
′
r′−1
G(s′0) . . . G(s
′
r′−1)
× (pπλ)r+r
′
r−1∏
i=1
r′−1∏
j=1
[
1 +
1− πλ
pπλ
η˜
2δN
δ∑
ℓ<i
sℓ,
∑
ℓ<j
s′
ℓ
]
×∑
k
δk,
∑
j<r
sj−
∑
j<r′ s
′
j
lim
L→∞
1
π2
λ
L
L∑
s=0
δλ,λ(s,A,Z)δλ,λ(s+k,A,Z)φsφs+k (128)
As in the calculation of the volatility in [10], lacking as yet a method to deal with all
the complicated terms generated by the factor proportional to the learning rate η˜, we
have to restrict ourselves in practice to approximations. As in [10] we first remove the
most tricky terms by putting η˜ → 0. This gives
A2λ =
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δNpπλ)r+r
′ ∑
s0...sr−1
G(s0) . . .G(sr−1)
∑
s′0...s
′
r′−1
G(s′0) . . .G(s
′
r′−1)
× ∑
k
δk,
∑
j<r
sj−
∑
j<r′ s
′
j
lim
L→∞
1
π2
λ
L
L∑
s=0
δλ,λ(s,A,Z)δλ,λ(s+k,A,Z)φsφs+k (129)
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We then assume that the limit L → ∞ in the last line converts the associated sample
average into a full average over the statistics of the Gaussian fields φℓ given by (62), i.e.
lim
L→∞
1
π2
λ
L
L∑
s=0
δλ,λ(s,A,Z)δλ,λ(s+k,A,Z)φsφs+k →
lim
L→∞
1
π2
λ
L
L∑
s=0
δλ,λ(s,A,Z)δλ,λ(s+k,A,Z)〈φsφs+k〉φ|A,Z =
1
2
[1 + C(k)]
Separating the correlation function into a persistent and a non-persistent term, C(k) =
c + C˜(k), and returning to the earlier notation with time differences inside the kernels
G, results in the history-conditioned equivalent of the volatility approximation in [10]:
A2λ =
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δNpπλ)r+r
′ ∑
s0...sr−1
G(s0) . . . G(sr−1)
∑
s′0...s
′
r′−1
G(s′0) . . . G(s
′
r′−1)
× 1
2
[
1 + c + C˜(
∑
j<r
sj −
∑
j<r′
s′j)
]
=
1 + c
2(1 + χpπλ)
2
+
1
2
∫
dsds′ (1I + pπλG)
−1C˜(s− s′)(1I + pπλG)−1 (130)
where 1I(x, y) = δ(x − y). In order to get to the present stage we have averaged the φ-
dependent terms inside A2λ over the Gaussian measure 〈. . .〉φ|A,Z. Consistency demands
that in working out σ2
λ
= A2λ − A
2
λ we do the same with the term A
2
λ, where Aλ is
given by (124), so our approximation for the history-conditioned volatility becomes
σ2λ = A
2
λ −
〈φ2λ〉
(1 + χpπλ)
2
= A2λ − limL→∞
1
(Lπλ)
2
L∑
ℓℓ′=1
δλ,λ(ℓ,A,Z)δλ,λ(ℓ′,A,Z)
1 + C(ℓ− ℓ′)
2(1 + χpπλ)
2
=
1
2
∫
dsds′ (1I + pπλG)
−1(s)C˜(s− s′)(1I + pπλG)−1(s′) (131)
Our final step again follows [10]. We assume that the non-persistent correlations C˜(t)
decay vary fast, away from the value C˜(0) = 1− c, so that in the expansion of (131) in
powers of G we retain only the zero-th term:
σ2λ =
1
2
(1− c) (132)
We may now return to expression (120) and insert our approximations (124) and (132):
Ω = lim
p→∞
∑
λ
πλ Erf
2

 (1− ζ)φλ√
2(1 + χpπλ)
√
ζ2κ2 + 1
2
(1− ζ)2(1− c)


=
∫
dfdφ ̺(f, φ)f Erf2

 (1− ζ)φ√
2(1 + χf)
√
ζ2κ2 + 1
2
(1− ζ)2(1− c)

 (133)
with
̺(f, φ) = lim
p→∞
1
p
∑
λ
δ[f − pπλ]δ[φ− φλ] (134)
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We know the φλ to be Gaussian variables, with 〈φλ〉 = 0 and 〈φ
2
λ〉 = 12(1 + c) (see the
above derivation of σ2
λ
where this was shown and used). Hence, upon making our final
simplifying assumption that in the relevant orders of our calculation the correlations
between the history frequencies πλ and the Gaussian fields φλ are irrelevant, we obtain
̺(f, φ) = ̺(f)
e−φ
2/(1+c)√
π(1 + c)
(135)
and hence (133) simplifies to
Ω =
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)f
∫
Dx Erf2

 x(1 − ζ)√1 + c
2(1 + χf)
√
ζ2κ2 + 1
2
(1− ζ)2(1− c)

 (136)
Using the integral
∫
Dx Erf2(Ax) = 4
π
arctan[
√
1 + 4A2] − 1, in combination with the
identity
∫
df ̺(f)f = 1, our approximate expression for the parameter Ω thus becomes
Ω =
4
π
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)f arctan
[
1 +
(1− ζ)2(1 + c)
(1 + χf)2[ζ2κ2 + 1
2
(1− ζ)2(1− c)]
] 1
2
− 1 (137)
In the limit of strictly fake history we recover from (137) the value limζ→1Ω =
(4/π) arctan[1] − 1 = 0, as it should. For MGs with strictly true market history, on
the other hand, expression (137) simplifies to
lim
ζ→0
Ω =
4
π
∫ ∞
0
df ̺(f)f arctan
[
1 +
2(1 + c)
(1 + χf)2(1− c)
] 1
2
− 1 (138)
In accordance with earlier observations in simulations [15] we also see that, as the system
approaches the phase transition when α is lowered from within the ergodic regime, the
increase of the susceptibility χ automatically reduces the width parameter Ω, until it
vanishes completely at the critical point.
7. Closed theory for persistent observables in the ergodic regime
We have now obtained a closed theory for the time-translation invariant states of our
MG, albeit in approximation. It consists of the equations (84,85,86,87) for the persistent
order parameters, combined with expressions (116,118) for the shape and (114,137)
for the width of the relative history frequency distribution ̺(f). This theory predicts
correctly (i) that the phase transition point αc(T ) of the MG with history is identical to
that of the model with fake memory, (ii) that at the transition point the relative history
frequency distribution reduces to ̺(f) = δ[f − 1] (with at that point also the order
parameters all becoming independent of whether we have true or fake history), and (iii)
the shape of the relative history frequency distribution. In the limit α→∞ the theory
also reproduces the correct order parameter values χ = φ = c = 0, for any value of ζ .
For ζ = 0 (strictly true memory) it predicts limα→∞Ω =
1
3
and hence limα→∞ µ2 ≈ 1.37.
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Figure 3. Left: the predicted persistent correlations c together with simulation data
in the non-ergodic regime, for the on-line MG with strictly true history (i.e. ζ = 0;
the solid line gives the theoretical prediction, full circles the experimental data) and
for the on-line MG with strictly fake memory (i.e. ζ = 1; the dashed line gives the
theoretical prediction, open circles the experimental data). In both cases decision noise
was absent. Right: the corresponding predicted fraction φ of frozen agents, under the
same experimental conditions and with the same meaning of lines and markers.
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Figure 4. The moments µ2 =
∫
df ̺(f)f2 and µ3 =
∫
df ̺(f)f3 of the distribution of
relative history frequencies for the MG with strictly true history and absent decision
noise (i.e. ζ = T = 0), as predicted by the theory (solid and dashed lines), compared
to the moments as measured in numerical simulations (markers, with circles indicating
µ2 and squares indicating µ3). Note that µ0 = µ1 = 1 (by definition).
Let us finally reduce our closed equations to a more compact form, for the simplest
nontrivial case of the MG with strictly true market history (i.e. ζ = 0) and without
decision noise (i.e. σ[∞] = 1). Here we have
u =
√
αχ
R
S0
√
2
χ =
1− φ
αχ
R
φ = 1− Erf[u] (139)
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c = 1− Erf[u] + 1
2u2
Erf[u]− 1
u
√
π
e−u
2
(140)
χ
R
=
∫
Dz
[
1 +
1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3)
][
e−z
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2+ 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2) + χ
]−1
(141)
S20 = (1 + c)
∫
Dz
[
1 +
1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3)
][
e−z
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2+ 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2) + χ
]−2
(142)
Ω =
∫
Dz
[
1 +
1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3)
]
ez
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2− 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2)
×


4
π
arctan
[
1 +
2(1 + c)
(1− c)
[
1 + χez
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2− 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2)
]2
] 1
2− 1

 (143)
Upon using (140) to write c as a function of u, i.e. c = c(u) with c(u) denoting the
right-hand side of (140), and upon eliminating the quantities φ and S0, we find ourselves
with a closed set of equations for the trio {u, χ,Ω}:
u =
Erf[u]
χ
√
2α(1 + c)


∫
Dz
1 + 1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3)[
e−z
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2+ 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2) + χ
]2


− 1
2
(144)
χ =
Erf[u]
α


∫
Dz
1 + 1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3)
e−z
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2+ 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2) + χ


−1
(145)
Ω =
∫
Dz
[
1 +
1
6
√
Ω(3z − z3)
]
ez
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2− 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2) (146)
×


4
π
arctan
[
1 +
2[1 + c(u)]
[1− c(u)]
[
1 + χez
√
Ω+ 5
6
Ω2− 1
2
(Ω+ 1
2
Ω2)
]2
] 1
2− 1


Solving these three coupled equations numerically, followed by comparison with
simulation data, shows a surprising level of agreement, in spite of the expansions
and assumptions which have been used to derive (144,145,146). Figure 3 shows the
performance of the theory in describing the on-line MG with strictly true market history
(i.e. ζ = 0), together with similar data for the on-line fake history MG (i.e. ζ = 1), for
comparison††. In all these simulations N = 8193. Calculation of the first two non-trivial
moments µk of the distribution of relative history frequencies, see e.g. figure 4 (where
in the simulations αN2 = 228), shows that for small values of the width of ̺(f) (i.e. µ2
close to one, which is true close to and below the critical point) the predictions of the
theory are excellent, but that the performance of equations (144,145,146) deteriorates
for larger values of µ2. This is obvious, since these equations result effectively from an
expansion for small values of µ2−1. Taking this expansion to higher orders should lead
to systematic improvement, but will be non-trivial.
††Below the critical point, where χ =∞ throughout, equation (137) predicts that Ω = 0. This implies
that ̺(f) = δ[f − 1] for α < αc(T ), and that below the critical point the differences between true
and fake history (if any) are confined to dynamical phenomena or to states without time-translation
invariance. This confirms earlier observations in numerical simulations [15], where it was found that
the persistent order parameters in MGs with and without history were identical in the low α regime.
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8. Discussion
We have developed a mathematical procedure for the derivation of exact dynamical
solutions for Minority Games with real market histories, using the generating functional
analysis techniques of [17]. So far these techniques had only been developed for (and
applied successfully to) the less realistic but mathematically simpler MG versions with
fake market histories, restricting theoretical progress to those particular game versions
only. We have shown how the technical difficulties associated with the non-Markovian
character of the microscopic laws induced by having real histories can be dealt with,
and found (in the infinite system size limit) exact and closed macroscopic laws from
which to solve the canonical dynamic order parameters for the standard (on-line) MG
with true market history. Here these laws turn out to be formulated in terms of two
effective equations (rather than a single equation, as for models with fake histories):
one for an effective agent, and one for an effective overall market bid. In the second
part of this paper we have constructed solutions for these effective equations, focusing
mostly on the usual persistent observables of the MG in time-translation invariant states
(persistent correlations and the fraction of frozen agents) and on the calculation from
first principles of the distribution of history frequencies. These objects are calculated in
the form of an expansion in powers of the width of the history frequency distribution,
of which the first few terms are derived in explicit form. The final theory was shown to
give accurate predictions for the persistent observables and for the shape of the history
frequency distribution. It gives precise predictions for the width in the region where
this width remains relatively small (which is inevitable in view of the expansion used).
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Appendix A. Recovering the fake history limit
It helpful for our understanding of the N → ∞ limit in (59,60) to first return to the
simplest case where we know what the outcome should be, being ζ = 1, i.e. fake history
strings of the inconsistent type (4). This is the model which was solved in [10]. In doing
so we en passant re-confirm the correctness of the assumed scaling δN = η˜/2p.
For ζ = 1 we see in (15) and (17) that both λ(. . .) andW [. . .] lose their dependence
on the path {A}, and reduce to
λ(ℓ, Z) =


sgn[Z(ℓ, 1)]
...
sgn[Z(ℓ,M)]

 W [ℓ, ℓ′;Z] = δλ(ℓ,Z),λ(ℓ′,Z) (A.1)
The role of the Gaussian variables {Z} has thereby been reduced to determining the
statistics of the symmetric random matrix B with entries Bℓℓ′ = W [ℓ, ℓ′;Z]:
P[B] =
〈∏
ℓ,ℓ′
δ
[
Bℓℓ′ −
log2(p)∏
λ=1
θ[Z(ℓ, λ)Z(ℓ′, λ)]
]〉
{Z}
(A.2)
with p = 2M = αN . The two relevant properties of these matrices are relatively easily
derived, and are found to be the following. For any cyclic combination of r-th moments
(with r > 0), where s1 > s2 > . . . > sr and r > 1 (no summations) one has
〈Bs1s2Bs2,s3 . . .Bsr ,s1〉B = p1−r (A.3)
The second type of average one needs involves two time-ordered strings of matrix
elements (of lengths r and r′, respectively) connected by two further matrix elements,
where s0 > s1 > . . . > sr and s
′
0 > s
′
1 > . . . > s
′
r′:
〈[Bs0s1Bs1s2 . . .Bsr−1sr ]Bsrs′r′ [Bs′0s′1Bs′1s′2 . . .Bs′r′−1s′r′ ]Bs0s′0〉
= p
∑r
i=0
∑r′
j=0
δsis′j
−r−r′−1
(A.4)
The partial decoupling of the paths {A} and {Z} implies that our expressions for the
kernels R and Σ simplify to
R(t, t′) = lim
δN→0
δ
δAe(t′)
〈
Bℓℓ′ 〈A(ℓ)〉{A|B}
〉
B
∣∣∣
ℓ=t/δN ,ℓ′=t′/δN
(A.5)
Σ(t, t′) = η˜ lim
δN→0
1
δN
〈
Bℓℓ′ 〈A(ℓ)A(ℓ′)〉{A|B}
〉
B
∣∣∣
ℓ=t/δN ,ℓ′=t′/δN
(A.6)
Since the bid evolution process (49) is now linear in {A}, and involves only {A}-
independent zero-average Gaussian fields φℓ, where 〈φℓφℓ′〉{φ|B} = 12Bℓℓ′[1 + C(ℓ, ℓ′)],
it is easily solved for any given realization of the random matrix B:
A(ℓ) = Ae(ℓ) + φℓ +
∑
r>0
(− η˜
2
)r
∑
k<ℓ
[(GB)r]ℓk [Ae(k) + φk] (A.7)
in which GB denotes the matrix with entries (GB)ℓℓ′ = G(ℓ, ℓ′)Bℓℓ′ (i.e. involving
component multiplication rather than matrix multiplication). To make a comparison
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with the results of [10] we must remove the external bid perturbations Ae(ℓ) after they
have served to generate the response function R.
We can evaluate (A.5) using only expression (A.7), the causality of the response
function, and formula (A.3). These give, with δ/δAe(ℓ) = δN
−1∂/∂A(ℓ):
R(ℓ, ℓ′) = lim
Ae→0
lim
δN→0
∂
∂Ae(ℓ′)
1
δN
∫
dB P[B] Bℓℓ′ 〈A(ℓ)〉{φ|B}
= lim
δN→0
1
δN
∑
r≥0
(− η˜
2
)r
∫
dB P[B] Bℓℓ′ [(GB)r]ℓℓ′
= lim
δN→0
1
δN
{
δℓℓ′ − δNG(ℓ, ℓ′)
+
∑
r>1
(−δN )r
∑
s2>s3>...>sr
G(ℓ, s2)G(s2, s3) . . .G(sr, ℓ
′)
}
(A.8)
We observe in (A.8), in view of δℓℓ′ → δNδ(t−t′) in the limit N →∞, that the canonical
scaling of time (modulo O(1) factors) is indeed δN = η˜/2p. We then find exactly the
expression in [10] for the on-line ‘fake history’ MG:
R(t, t′) = δ(t− t′) +∑
r>0
(−1)rGr(t, t′) = [1I +G]−1(t, t′) (A.9)
Had we chosen an alternative scaling with N of δN , we would have found either the
trivial result R = 0, or an ill-defined expression.
Next we turn to expression (60) for the effective agent’s noise covariances, with
Ae = 0. The equivalence of the present expression and that in [10] will be more
transparent upon renaming (ℓ, ℓ′)→ (s0, s′0) and D(k, k′) = 1 + C(k, k′):
Σ(s0, s
′
0) = lim
δN→0
η˜
δN
∫
dB P[B] Bs0s′0 〈A(s0)A(s′0)〉{φ|B}
= lim
δN→0
η˜
2δN
∑
r,r′≥0
(− η˜
2
)r+r
′ ∑
s1...sr
∑
s′1...s
′
r′
D(sr, s
′
r′)
× G(s0, s1) . . . G(sr−1, sr) G(s′0, s′1) . . . G(s′r′−1, s′r′)
× 〈(Bs0s1 . . .Bsr−1sr)Bsrs′r′(Bs′0s′1 . . .Bs′r−1s′r)Bs0s′0〉B (A.10)
with the proviso that when r = 0 we must interpret the sums as
∑
s1...s2 → 1,
G(s0, s1) . . . G(sr−1, sr) → 1 and Bs0s1 . . .Bsr−1sr → 1 (and similarly when r′ = 0).
Since the kernel Σ(s0, s
′
0) is symmetric, we may without loss of generality choose s
′
0 ≥ s0.
Dependent on the whether any or both of the indices (r, r′) are zero, we have to evaluate
the following averages (with the short-hand δij = 1− δij):
• r = r′ = 0: here the average of the last line in (A.10) reduces to
〈. . .〉B = 〈B2s0s′0〉 = 〈Bs0s′0〉 = δs0s′0 +
1
p
δs0s′0 (A.11)
• r′ = 0, r > 0: here the average in (A.10) reduces to two terms (representing the
cases s0 = s
′
0 versus s0 < s
′
0), which are both of the form (A.3),
〈. . .〉B = 〈(Bs0s1 . . .Bsr−1sr)Bsrs′0Bs0s′0〉 = p−rδs0s′0 + p−r−1δs0s′0 (A.12)
where we used Bkk = 1, for any k. The case r = 0, r′ > 0 is clearly equivalent.
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• r, r′ > 0: now the relevant average reduces to that of (A.4),
〈. . .〉B = 〈[Bs0s1 . . .Bsr−1sr ]Bsrs′
r′
[Bs′0s′1 . . .Bs′r′−1s′r′ ]Bs0s′0〉
= p
∑r
i=0
∑r′
j=0
δsis′j
−r−r′−1
(A.13)
Expression (A.13) reduces to those derived for the cases where r or r′ is zero (or both),
so it is true for any (r, r′). We may thus insert (A.13) into (A.10), and obtain:
Σ(s0, s
′
0) = lim
δN→0
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
s1...sr
∑
s′1...s
′
r′
D(sr, s
′
r′)
r∏
i=0
r′∏
j=0
[
1 + (p− 1)δsis′j
]
× G(s0, s1) . . .G(sr−1, sr) G(s′0, s′1) . . .G(s′r′−1, s′r′)
= lim
N→∞
∑
r,r′≥0
(−δN )r+r′
∑
s1...sr
∑
s′1...s
′
r′
D(sr, s
′
r′)
×
r∏
i=0
r′∏
j=0
[
1 +
η˜
2δN
δsis′j [1−O(δN )]
]
× G(s0, s1) . . .G(sr−1, sr) G(s′0, s′1) . . .G(s′r′−1, s′r′)
=
∑
r,r′≥0
(−1)r+r′
∫ ∞
0
ds1 . . . dsrds
′
1 . . . ds
′
r′
r∏
i=0
r′∏
j=0
[
1 +
1
2
η˜δ[si − s′j]
]
× G(s0, s1) . . .G(sr−1, sr) G(s′0, s′1) . . .G(s′r′−1, s′r′)
× [1 + C(sr, s′r′)] (A.14)
Also (A.14) is identical to the corresponding expression in [10], as it should.
Appendix B. Expansion of bid sign recurrence probabilities
Here we derive the expansion (106) of the function Φ(g1, g2, . . .) as defined in (99). We
abbreviate
Eλ = Erf
[ (1− ζ)Aλ√
2
√
ζ2κ2 + (1− ζ)2σ2
λ
]
(B.1)
with
∑
λ πλE
r
λ
= 〈Er〉. These short-hands allow us to compactify (99) to
Φ(g1, g2, . . .) =
1
2
∏
j≥1
[∑
λ
πλ(1 + Eλ)
gj
]
+
1
2
∏
j≥1
[∑
λ
πλ(1− Eλ)gj
]
=
1
2
∏
j≥1
[ gj∑
n=0
(
gj
n
)
〈En〉
]
+
1
2
∏
j≥1
[ gj∑
n=0
(
gj
n
)
(−1)n〈En〉
]
=
g1∑
n1=0
g2∑
n2=0
. . .
(
g1
n1
)(
g2
n2
)
. . .
1
2
[1 + (−1)n1+n2+...]〈En1〉〈En2〉 . . .
(B.2)
Since the overall average bid in the MG is equally likely to be positive than negative,
and since (B.1) tells us that sgn[Eλ] = sgn[Aλ], the moments 〈Er〉 for even values of r
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will have to be zero. From this it follows that
Φ(g1, g2, . . .) =
∑
0≤n1≤
1
2
g1
∑
0≤n2≤
1
2
g2
. . .
(
g1
2n1
)(
g2
2n2
)
. . . 〈E2n1〉〈E2n2〉 . . .
=
∏
j≥1

1 + ∑
1≤n≤gj/2
(
gj
2n
)
〈E2n〉


so
logΦ(g1, g2, . . .) =
∑
j≥1
log
[
1 +
∑
1≤n≤gj/2
(
gj
2n
)
〈E2n〉
]
(B.3)
Equation (B.3) tells us, firstly, that
Φ(1, 1, 1, . . .) = 1 (B.4)
For arbitrary history coincidence numbers (g1, g2, . . .), not necessarily all equal to one,
we may expand (B.3) in the moments 〈Er〉:
log Φ(g1, g2, . . .) =
∑
j≥1
log
[
1 +
1
2
gj(gj −1)〈E2〉+ 1
24
gj(gj −1)(gj −2)(gj −3)〈E4〉
+O(〈E6〉)
]
=
1
2
∑
j≥1
gj(gj −1)
{
〈E2〉+ 1
12
[
(gj −2)(gj −3)〈E4〉 − 3gj(gj −1)〈E2〉2
]}
+O(〈E6〉)
Finally, in leading order in E we may regard the variables Eλ as proportional to Aλ,
and therefore as distributed in a Gaussian manner. This implies (since 〈E〉 = 0) that
in leading order we have 〈E4〉 = 3〈E2〉. Hence
logΦ(g1, g2, . . .) =
1
2
〈E2〉∑
j≥1
gj(gj − 1)− 1
4
〈E2〉2∑
j≥1
gj(gj − 1)(2gj − 3)
+O(〈E6〉) (B.5)
Appendix C. Combinatorics in history frequency moments
In this appendix we calculate the combinatorial factors Gk,Ra,b as defined in (111). They
can be obtained by differentiation of a simple generating function:
Gk,Ra,b = R
−k
k∑
g1=0
k−g1∑
g2=0
(
k
g1
)(
k − g1
g2
)
(R − 2)k−g1−g2ga1gb2
= R−k lim
x,y→1
(x
d
dx
)a(y
d
dy
)b(R− 2 + x+ y)k (C.1)
In particular:
Gk,R2,0 = kR
−1 + k(k − 1)R−2 (C.2)
Gk,R3,0 = kR
−1 + 3k(k − 1)R−2 + k(k − 1)(k − 2)R−3 (C.3)
Gk,R4,0 = kR
−1 + 7k(k − 1)R−2 + 6k(k − 1)(k − 2)R−3 + k(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)R−4(C.4)
Gk,R2,2 = k(k − 1)R−2 + 2k(k − 1)(k − 2)R−3 + k(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)R−4 (C.5)
